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.• 
With such a huge population, the population policy in the Chinese Mainland has 
impacts on not only herself but also around the world. The alarmingly increasing 
sex ratio at birth seems to be a consequence of the family policy and son 
preference. Other than the sex ratio at birth, relative mortality rate for infant 
females to males and the number of girl abandonment have also increased. To 
continue controlling population growth without unwanted consequences, it is 
important to analyze gender preference to find out the underlying factors and 
their magnitudes. In this paper, we explore the following question: (1) whether 
son preference really exists in the Chinese Mainland; (2) factors underlying 
gender bias and their magnitudes; (3) the impact of the population policy on 
gender bias. 
With the data from Gansu province collected in the second phase of the Chinese 
Mainland In-depth Fertility Survey conducted in 1988, two econometric models 
using the desired sex of the next child and the difference in the number of sons 
and daughters as the independent variables are estimated. Results suggest that: (1) 
son preference does exist; (2) economic, social and cultural factors and the 
, population policy have impacts on gender bias. The findings also suggest that 
there is a dilemma between population control and reducing son bias. With those 
findings, we have three suggestions. (1) To reduce the son preference, the 
i 
government should improve the education and social status of women, and 
establish a sound social security system as the long term objectives. (2) Enacting 
regulation against sex discrimination should also be considered. (3) In the short 
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The Chinese Mainland is a huge country, especially in terms of her population. 
At the end of 1998，the total population of the Chinese Mainland was 1.248 
billion, about one-fifth of the world's population. With such a huge proportion of 
•• 
the world's population, any change in her population policy will inevitably exert 
tremendous impact on the world, notably through the labor market and food 
requirements. 
Such a huge and poorly educated population impedes social and economic 
development in the Chinese Mainland. For these reasons, the central government 
launched family planning policies in the 1970's and has implemented the one-
child policy since 1979. Such policies seem to be successful in terms of meeting 
the state's population target and lowering the fertility rate'. However, 
accompanying those successes are problems, the most alarming issue being the 
rise in the sex ratio at birthl (Table 1) It is very clear that the ratio has risen 
above the normal international standard of 107 (Ma et al. 1998) since the middle 
of thel980's and it continues to rise. Moreover, the ratio increases with the order 
of birth, e.g., the sex ratio at birth for the second child is larger than that for the 
first child. Compared to other East Asian countries with such a phenomenon, the 
figure in the Chinese Mainland is even higher. (Table 2) There seems to be son 
preference. Under the one-child policy households often choose to have a son to 
, secure their old age and continue their ancestral line. 
‘Concepts and definitions in demography may be found in Appendix 1. 
- S e e Appendix 1 for its definition. 
1 
The higher sex ratio at birth is a concern of researchers because it will inevitably 
induce problems in the future. These problems include a shortage of females in 
the future marriage market if the norm of one marriage partner is to be up-held\ 
the proliferation of such activities as infant betrothal or bride-buying, migration 
between regions to seek marriage partners, development of prostitution and some 
. criminal issues such as abduction. Moreover, sex-selective abortion and 
infanticide itself are forms of discrimination against females. There is evidence 
that, after the implementation of the one-child policy, there have been more 
abandoned children and more than 90 per cent of them are girls. Overt sexual 
discrimination is a serious issue as the survival rate of abandoned children is 
much lower than that of other children. 
The main reason behind these phenomena is often attributed to the gender bias 
towards sons. If no gender bias existed, there should be no such problems as the 
rise in the sex ratio at birth and sex-selective children abandonment. Does son 
preference really exist? Given the existence of gender preference, what are the 
factors behind it? Can this preference be influenced by factors that can be 
manipulated? Is there something the government can do without changing the 
one-child policy? Do population policies itself influence gender preference? This 
thesis is an attempt to answer these questions. The data from Gansu province 
collected in the second phase of the Chinese Mainland In-depth Fertility Survey 
conducted in February 1988 is used in this thesis to study the gender bias in the 
Chinese Mainland. Gender preference covers many areas such as discrimination 
t 
3 According to Li, N. (1995), the sex ratio at birth in 1990 of 114 will result in 9 per cent of males 
without marriage partners after about 20 years. 
2 
in workplaces, political issues, and resource allocation within a family. In this 
thesis we focus on gender preference with respect to households' desire about the 
sex of their children. 
We estimate two econometric models and find out that: (1) Son preference does 
exist; (2) Economic, social and cultural factors and the population policy do 
.* influence gender preference. As households regard children not just as 
consumption goods, but also as investment goods, expected contributions of a 
son (daughter) to parents increases (reduces) son preference. The findings also 
suggest that there is a dilemma between population control and son preference: 
stringent population control intensifies son preference. The government should, 
in the long term, pay more attention to such policies as establishing a pension 
system, to ameliorate the side effects of the one-child policy. Regulations against 
sex discrimination should also be put into consideration. In the short term, 
stricter monitoring of people's fertility behaviors should be considered. 
This thesis is arranged as follows. The second chapter discusses the 
implementation of the family planning policy and its impacts on the population 
and gender bias in the Chinese Mainland in general. The third chapter reviews 
studies on gender preference in and outside the Chinese Mainland. The economic 
framework will be introduced and two econometric models based on this 
framework are constructed in the fourth chapter. The data set used in this thesis is 
also introduced in this chapter. The fifth chapter discusses the estimated results 
of these two models. Finally, the policy implications of those results are 
« 
4 The definition of indicators of gender preference in this thesis is discussed in chapter IV 
"Methodology and data". 
3 
discussed in the concluding chapter. 
« 
4 
Table 1 Sex Ratio at Birth in the Chinese Mainland 
Year~~Overall~^Yst ^ ^ 4^ 5th &~~1st - Overall Overall 
> 4th* # $ 
1950 - - - - - - 112.52 - - ~ ~ 
1951 - - - - - - 109.1 - -
1952 - - - - - - 107.42 - -
1953 - - - - - - 107.57 - -
1954 - - - - - - 105.53 - -
... 1955 - - - - - - 106.81 - -
1956 - - - - - - 107.32 - -
1957 - - - - - - 104.89 - -
1958 - - - - - - 105.89 - -
1959 - - - - - - 102.09 - -
1960 110.3 - - - - - 110.63 110.3 -
1961 108.8 - - - - - 108.25 108.8 -
1962 106.6 - - - - - 106.31 106.6 -
1963 107.1 - - - - - 108.28 107.1 -
1964 106.6 - - - - - 106.68 106.6 -
1965 106.2 - - - - - 106.94 106.2 -
1966 112.2 - - - - - 112.53 112.2 -
1967 106.6 - - - - - 106.46 106.6 -
1968 102.5 - - - - - 102.5 102.5 -
1969 104.5 - - - - - 106.12 104.5 -
1970 105.9 - - - - - 105.13 105.9 -
1971 105.2 - - - - - 104.63 105.2 -
1972 107 - - - - - 107.54 107 -
1973 106.3 - - - - - 105.65 106.3 -
1974 106.7 - - - - - 106.41 106.6 -
1975 106.4 - - - - - 106.52 106.4 -
1976 107.4 - - - - - 106.99 107.4 -
1977 106.7 - - - - - 105.97 106.7 -
« 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 1 - continued 
Year~~Overall~~Yst 2^ ^ 4^ 5th&~~1st - Overall Overall 
> 4th* # $ 
1978 105.9 - - - - - 106.18~~105.9 - ~ ~ 
1979 105.8 - - - - - 105.7 105.8 -
1980 107.38 107.69 103.3 112.98 110.71 107.03 107.69 107.4 
1981 107.13 105.15 106.71 111.3 106.47 114.1 106.32 107.1 107.1 
1982 107.17 106.56 105.18 109.38 112.87 109.94 107.21 107.2 107.2 
.. 1983 107.89 107.75 107.23 109.45 104.74 112.14 107.88 107.9 107.9 
1984 108.46 102.48 113.27 113.04 115.35 127.28 107.37 108.5 108.5 
1985 111.42 106.55 115.94 114.07 126.87 117.27 110.56 111.4 111.4 
1986 112.3 105.36 116.93 123.08 125.33 123.5 111.05 112.3 112.3 
1987 110.96 106.79 112.78 118.87 118.56 124.62 109.89 111 111 
1988 108.1 101.5 114.5 117.1 123.1 108.7 106.49 108.1 108.1 
1989 113.9 105.2 121 124.3 131.7 129.8 - 111.3 113.9 
1990 114.7 - - - - - - - 114.7 
1991 116.1 110.8 122.6 124.4(3 - - - - 116.1 
+) 
1992 114.2 106.7 125.7 126.7(3 - - - 113 114.2 
+) 
1993 114.1 105.6 130.2 126.1(3 - - - - 114.1 
+) 
1994 - - - - - - - - . 
1995 117.4 104.4 - - - - - _ _ 
Source: 
The overall figure for 1960 to 1979 is from Johansson and Nygren (1991). 
1980-1987 from <<Almanac of China's Population 1991». 
1989-1993 from Gu and Roy (1995) 
1995 figure from Gao, Liu and Xia(1997) 
, * From <<Population and Economics>>, No. 5, 1997 
#From Chang and Yi(1994) 
6 
$ From Chang and Roy (丨 995) 
Key: 
"Overall" means the sex ratio of all children at birth, i.e. the number of male given birth 
over the number of female given birth and then time it by 100. 
The 产 order sex ratio at birth means the sex ratio of the children in the 产 order of birth. 
For example, i =2, in the fourth column of table, the index shows that the sex ratio of all 
second children at birth was 124.3 in 1989. 
(3+) means the 3'^  order of birth and above. 
t 
7 
Table 2 Sex Ratio at Birth and Total Fertility Rate: Chinese Mainland, 
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea 
Year Chinese Mainland Taiwan South Korea 
~~~SRB TFR SRB TTO S ^ 1¾¾~~~ 
T ^ F074 2 ^ 106.4 : 103.9 -
1981 107.1 2.63 107.0 - 107 -
1982 107.2 2.86 106.9 - 106.9 2.7 
1983 107.9 2.42 106.7 2.16 107.7 -
•• 1984 108.5 2.35 107.3 - 108.7 2.1 
1985 111.4 2.20 106.6 - 110.0 -
1986 112.3 2.42 107.2 1.68 111.9 -
1987 111.0 2.59 108.3 1.70 109.0 1.6 
1988 108.1 2.52 108.2 1.85 113.5 1.6 
1989 113.9 2.35 108.6 1.68 112.1 -
1990 114.7 2.31 110.2 1.81 116.9 1.6 
1991 116.1 2.20 110 1.72 112.9 -
1992 114.2 2.00 - - 114.0 -
1993 114.1 - - - - -
Source: Gu and Roy(1995) 
Key: 
SRB: Sex ratio at birth 
TFR: Total fertility rate 




Population Policy in PRC 
To better understand the issue of gender bias, it is useful to review the population 
policy since the communists came to power in 1949. Statistics suggests that the 
population policy introduced by the Chinese government is effective in meeting 
population targets and reducing the total fertility rate. However, those policies 
.* 
also result in such unintended and perverse consequences such high sex ratio at 
birth and missing girls. In this chapter, we will review the population policy 
followed by an overview of the population growth under those policies. Finally, 
its perverse consequence will be discussed. 
II . l /AHistorical Review 
Before 1978 
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949，the health of 
the population improved substantially as witnessed by the falling mortality rate. 
As a result, the population grew at a rapid rate. The total population of PRC 
increased from 574.8 million in 1952 to 646.5 million in 1957 (Table 3). The 
birth rates during 1949 and 1957 were within the range of 31-37%o, and were 
thus at quite a high level. In response, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party advocated birth control to bring down the birth rate to under 20%o. After a 
sharp reduction in the population by 10 million during the famine in the early 
1960's, the birth rate and the fertility rate jumped to 37.01%c and 6.02 
respectively, and the population stood at 372.9 million in 1962. (Table 4) This 
, prompted the Central Committee of the Communist Party to issue a document to 
implement birth control again in 1962. (Wang 1992) However, the Cultural 
9 
Revolution put a stop to the birth control campaign. Subsequently, the population 
went up to 829.9 million and 924.2 million in 1970 and 1975 respectively. In 
1971, the State Council started to recognize the importance of family planning. 
That year, the "later-longer-fewer" (wan xi shao) campaign introduced three 
reproductive goals, namely later marriage, longer spacing between the first and 
subsequent children, and fewer children. In 1972, in a report concerning grain 
issues, the Central Committee of the Communist Party stressed that family 
planning must be rigorously promoted and advocated nationwide with the 
exception of those areas populated by ethnic minorities. In 1973, family planning 
under the direct leadership of the State Council was re-introduced. In 1974, Mao 
Zedong, the Chairman of the Communist Party, stated in the National Planning 
Committee's report concerning the 1975 national economic planning that "the 
population must be controlled" (Wu 1996). 1973 is the first year that family 
planning became part of the national economic and social development plan of 
PRC. The total fertility rate, birth rate, and natural growth rate fell from 5.81, 
33.43%o and 25.83%o in 1970 to 3.57，23.01%o and 15.69%o in 1975, and 2.72, 
18.25%o and 12.00%o in 1978 respectively. (See table 3 and 4 for more details) 
Although birth control and family planning were advocated as early as the 1950's, 
they had not been implemented consistently throughout the period. Mao Zedong 
once stated that "things got done with more hands" (ren duo hao ban shi). Even 
in 1974 when the need to have family planning became very clear, Peng Yu, 
China's representative to the 2T^ Session of the United Nations Commission said 
in the session that "The creative power of the people is boundless, and, so is 
， man's ability to exploit and utilize natural resource", "revolution plus production 
1 0 
can solve the problem of feeding the population"\ 
After 1978 
After the death of Mao Zedong, the Chinese Mainland experienced dramatic 
policy changes, with population policy being one of them. The "four 
modernization" campaign (industry, agriculture, science and technology, and 
. .defense) was put forward by the government. Rapid population growth was then 
regarded as an obstacle to the four modernization as it would raise 
unemployment and lower capital accumulation, living standards, and even 
hamper education (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985). In addition, the large 
cohorts born in the middle of the 1960's would soon be entering childbearing age 
so that more births were expected. Under such circumstances, the one-child 
policy was officially announced in January 1979 (Larsen 1990). In fact, the 
slogan "later-longer-fewer" was modified to "one is best, at most two, never a 
third" at the end of 1979. (Wang 1992) To implement the one-child policy, one-
child certificates were issued, offering benefits to couples who promised to have 
one child only. Penalties, starting from 1979，have been imposed upon couples 
who violate the one-child policy. In addition, a birth-quota system was initiated 
in 1980 to manage women's reproductive behaviors and limit the number of 
births each year (Li, J. L. 1995). To ground the one-child policy on a more solid 
legal foundation, a new marriage law was promulgated that required each couple 
to practize birth control. 
Under the birth-quota system, the State Family Planning Commission sets a 
t 
5 Chinese statement on population at Bucharest, 1974 (1994), Population and Development 
Review 20. 
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national population target with reference to long term population targets, such as 
limiting the population to 1.3 billion in the year 2,000 and 1.4 billion in the year 
2,01C)6. The target number of births to the coming year is then passed on to the 
provinces. Provincial governments then assign responsibilities to local officials, 
through the city, country, or prefecture governments, stipulating the exact number 
of children permitted to be born in their areas. People who would like to give 
. . b i r t h have to apply for a quota and the local officials allocate the birth quota 
among them. (Li, J. L. 1995) Local officials have to ensure that the births within 
the quota by such means as providing contraceptives, educating people with 
contraceptive knowledge and promoting the benefits of having fewer children. 
People giving birth without quota are subjected to penalties including fines. 
During 1980-1983, there was no basic change in the family planning policy. 
However, there were many couples violating the policy by having two or more 
children. The government started to use more repressive methods to implement 
the one-child policy. In 1983, the government began to require sterilization of 
couples with two or more children, and abortion of unauthorized pregnancies 
(Larsen 1990). Such repressive methods did heighten tensions between couples 
and local family planning cadres. In response to the resistance, the Party Central 
Committee reviewed its policy in 1984 and issued Central Document 7 (Hardee-
Cleaveland and Banister 1988). The overall objective of the Document 7 was to 
set up a realistic, fair and reasonable family planning policy that was easy for 
cadres to implement under the goal of limiting the total population at 1.2 billion 
in the year 2,000. 
t 
6 Statement of Li Peng in the Ninth-Five Year Plan for the national socio-economic development 
of the People's Republic of China and the programme for the long-term objectives by 2010. See 
Almanac ofChina's Population 1997 : 2. 
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The Document 7 highlights three principles. According to Greenhalgh (1986), 
they were: 
First, family planning must serve the overall situation. In other words, 
birth planning must serve the country 's larger goals ofdeveloping the 
economy, raising living standards, and achieving the “four 
, modernization “ in agriculture, industry, defense, science and 
technology. Second, family planning cadres must seek truthfromfacts, 
changing policies and work methods only after careful investigation 
of local conditions. Criticizing the previous tendency to impose 
uniform measures on all couples and localities, the document urged 
cadres to be more flexible, to deal with cases on an individual basis, 
and to adapt methods to changing circumstances. Third, family 
planning must follow the mass line. With the aim of increasing 
voluntary participation in the program and improving the Party's 
relations with the people, the document instructed family planning 
workers to establish close rapport with the people, learn their needs, 
and, through rendering practical assistance, help them solve the 
concrete problems that underline their desiresfor more children. 
As the strong resistance to the one-child policy in some areas could have resulted 
in political instability, the government adopted a less restrictive policy. It adopted 
a strategy called "open a small hole to close up a large one" allowing certain 
types of couples to have a second child while the rest were only allowed to have 
one child. According to Greenhalgh (1986) there are two basic principles guiding 
the second-birth regulations, namely preserving the patrilineal family and 
1 3 
reducing gross inequalities which put burdens on underprivileged areas and 
groups. For example, in the former case, both spouses that are the only child of 
their own parents may get a quota for a second child in certain areas; in the latter 
case, both spouses belonging to ethnic minority groups may get a quota too. 
These principles seem to reflect that there were two kinds of individual most 
strongly opposing the one-child restriction. They were those who wished to 
.• 
preserve their patrilineal line and those who, for regional, occupational, or ethnic 
reasons, were in poor economic circumstances relative to the rest of the 
population. 
Greenhalgh (1986) also points out that there were three large policy shifts: (1) 
administratively, a shift from reliance on mobilization-type methods to more 
regularized and scientific management techniques; (2) strategically, a shift from 
focusing on changing ideas to an emphasis on altering socioeconomic conditions; 
(3) politically, a shift from an idealistic social engineering approach that assumes 
society is infinitely malleable, to a more realistic political strategy that 
accommodates socio-cultural realities. The Document 7 has great significance in 
the population control in PRC, as it lays out the fundamental philosophy upon 
which population policy has been based until now. Although some later 
documents have been issued, all were supplementary to the Document，? 
Family planning was not stringently implemented in many areas of the Chinese 
Mainland between mid-1984 to mid-1986. The rising birth rate was not curbed. 
In response to rumors that the policy had changed to allow couples to have more 
than two children, the Party's Central Committee issued Document 13 to 
7 See Greenhalgh, 1986. 
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supplement, clarify and reconfirm the Document 7 in May 1986. Since the 
middle of 1980's, the family planning policy was implemented together with 
more economic incentives. For example, in some areas, individuals who were not 
on the household register, normally out-of-plan children, were not eligible for 
allocation of cropland, which were adjusted every three years, and receipt of 
housing land at the time of marriage. (Greenhalgh et al. 1994) 
.• 
In the second half of the 1980's and the first half of the 1990's, the Chinese 
Mainland faced a birth peak. It was the direct consequence of the high birth rates 
that followed the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1961 and lasted from 1962 
through the early 1970's. As these children became adults, the number of couples 
increased. The difficulty in controlling the growth of population can be seen in 
table 3. The birth rate and natural growth rate in 1980 were 18.21%c and 11.87%c 
and jumped to 23.33%c and 16.61%o in 1987. The government recognized the 
situation and began to reassess its family planning program to strengthen 
implementation. With the existence of the patrilineal cultural norm, to gain the 
support of peasants for its population policy, in 1989 the government allowed 
couples in most rural areas whose first child was a daughter to have a second 
child (Li, J. L. 1995). As stated above, the population policy towards people in 
underprivileged areas and groups including poor areas was lenient. In general, 
notwithstanding the relaxation of the one-child policy for families with their first 
child being female in rural areas, enforcement has been more vigorous and 
persistent since the late 1980's. However, having more children imposed a bigger 
burden for economic development in poor areas. In 1989，in the report by the 
State Family Planning Commission and the Leading Group for the Development 
of Poor Areas, the government decided to integrate birth control with support for 
1 5 
the rural poor. 
By the end of 1989, the total population amounted to 1,127 million, and the birth 
and natural growth rates were 21.58%o and 15.04%c respectively. Under such 
reality, in 1990, the government adjusted its population target in its ten-year 
national economy and social development plan and the 8'^  Five-year Planning, 
.* 
changing the target population in the year 2,000 from under 1.2 billion to under 
1.3 billion. Also, it targeted the natural growth rate to be under 12.5%c within the 
following ten years (Li 1991). • 
1991 was the first time that the annual national population target was reached (Li 
1992). In this year, the government issued the document entitled ‘‘The Joint 
Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of PRC and the 
State Council for strengthening the family planning work and strictly controlling 
population growth" to strengthen the implementation of birth control by putting 
the responsibility of birth control on the shoulders of the highest ranking officials 
at each level. It linked the promotion of cadres directly to the results of 
population policy in their respective areas. This document stressed that the 
current population policies and strategy must be continuously implemented, and 
put more efforts on social welfare and social security in rural areas such as 
developing old age insurance. 
As the birth peak was over in early 1990's, the birth rate and natural growth rate 
came down very fast. These two figures went down from 21.06%o and 14.39%c in 
1990 to 17.12%o and 10.55%o in 1995. The total population only grew 5.9 per 
cent in this period. The population growth rates in 1995，1996 and 1997 were just 
1 6 
1.06 per cent, 1.05 per cent and 1.01 per cent respectively, which lower than 1.35 
per cent, the average population growth rate in the world in the first half of 
1990's (Liu 1997). Some analysts pointed out that the lowering of the birth rate 
was largely due to economic development as human capital becomes important 
when an economy developed into a certain level. Households would like to 
invest more on a child in order to develop this child's human capital rather than 
.^  
having more children. There were discussions about population targets could be 
attained through economic development, so that the population policy could be 
relaxed. In response to that kind of view, Jiang Zemin, the Chairman of the Party, 
expressed that it was wrong that the population target could be reached by market 
forces under market economy8. That "announcement" ensured continuation of 
population control policy. 
In 1996, the Fourth Session of the Eighth National People's Congress passed the 
"Ninth-five Year Plan for the National Socio-economic Development, the 
Program for the Long-term objectives by 2,010". In this document, the 
government determined to limit the average annual natural growth rate of 
population to under 1.08 per cent in the Ninth-five Year (Zhang and Li 1997). 
Due to the success in limiting the growth of the population, the population policy 
continued without big change. 
In 1999，the central government announced that the family policy would be 
continuously implemented in order to maintain a low population growth. To 
make family policy more effective and with less resistance, the family planning 
8 In Jiang Zemin's speech at the symposium convened by the Central committee of the 
Communist Party and the State Council for Family Planning Work. See Almanac of China's 
Population 1995 : 1. 
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program was to be implemented more closely with the effort of developing local 
economies, supporting the poor, providing universal education, protecting the 
environment and raising women's status. The population target for 2010 is under 
1.4 billion. (Hong Kong Economic Journal, October 13，1999) 
In short, the family policy was not consistently implemented until the 1970's due 
.' 
to political consideration. As the large and rapidly growing population became an 
obstacle to the "four modernization" of the Chinese Mainland, the government 
introduced the one-child policy in 1979. However, as the one-child policy 
conflicted with the traditional son preference and big families, especially in rural 
areas, there were conflicts between households and local family cadres. In order 
to release the tension and successfully implement the population policy, the 
government relaxed the one-child policy, allowing households who have a 
daughter as their first child to have a second child in rural areas. Since the late 
1980's, the government has increasingly recognized the contribution of economic 
factors in controlling population growth. She decided to implement family policy 
with more economic incentives, though there has not been any big policy shift 
since the promulgation of the Document 7. 
1 8 
II.2. Overview of the Fertility Rate and Population Growth under the 
Population Policy in the Chinese Mainland 
The Chinese Mainland has been carrying out its population policy to lower 
population growth for nearly thirty years since the 1970's. It is time to look at its 
effects. From table 4 and diagram 1，the total fertility rate in the Chinese 
Mainland remained high, about 6, from 1949 to 1958. Then it fell to 3.29 in 1961 
due to the Great Leap Forward and the famine that followed. Then it returned to 
around 6 until the early 1970's. 
Alarmed by the rise in fertility rate, family planning policy was given more 
attention in the upper echelon of the government. Since then, the rate has been on 
the decline, interrupted only by short episodes of fertility spurts. The relaxation 
of the one-child policy after the promulgation of the Central Document 7 in 1984 
may be the reason behind the increase in fertility around the second half of the 
1980's, though no solid evidence is available. 
The government's policy shifts emphasizing socioeconomic rather than 
ideological measures may be one of the factors attributing to the continuous 
decline in fertility after 1988. These shifts were very important as it took into 
account socioeconomic factors that influenced households' decisions on family 
size into the formulation of the population policy. This did not only resolve the 
political conflict but also motivate households to have fewer children. In 1992 
the rate fell below the replacement level of 2 and the downward trend has 
continued unabated. This may be due to the shift in the means for implementing 
family planning and the strengthening of family planning work since the earlier 
1990's. In addition, rapid economic development and higher living standards 
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raise the cost of bearing children. 
On the whole, in so far as the decline in the fertility rate and population growth 
are concerned, the population policy seems to be effective, though the decline is 
not sharp enough to meet the government's population target set in the 1980's. 
The Central Document 7 issued in 1984 aimed at limiting the total population at 
.* 
1.2 billion in the year 2,000, but the total population already exceeded 1.2 billion 
by 1995. In 1990，the government adjusted its population target in the year 2,000 
from under 1.2 billion to under 1.3 billion. The government aimed at controlling 
the natural growth rate to be under 12.5%o in next ten years (Li 1991). With these 
redefined targets, the family planning policy was quite successful in the 1990's 
in respect of limiting the population growth rate. The target of limiting the 
average annual natural growth rate to less than 1.08 per cent in the Ninth-five 
Year Plan seems to be attainable. According to the State Family Planning 
Commission, the population was reduced by 338 million in the past 30 years due 
to the family planning policy. (Hong Kong Economic Joumal, September 28, 
1999) 
So far, we have studied the national picture. Next, we look into figures in rural 
and urban areas. From table 5, the birth rates and natural population growth rates 
of both cities and counties fell over time. Both the birth rates and natural 
population growth rates of counties were higher than those of cities. This may 
due to the differences in economic development, economic activities and 
implementation of the population policy. First, the higher incomes of households 
in cities imply higher costs in raising children and higher return of investment in 
the human capital of a child. Second, as family planning authorities in cities had 
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more resources than that in counties, they may be able to offer more attractive 
incentives and better services, including contraceptive means to encourage 
households to follow the one-child policy? Third, family planning units in cities 
also had better controlling systems, such as they could implement the policy 
through the help of the compensation and benefits offered to workers in state 
owned enterprises. 
•* 
As stated above, the decline in the birth rate and natural population growth rate 
may be attributed to factors other than population policy, such as economic 
development. Table 6 shows the figures of the birth rate, natural population 
growth rate and GDP per capita for all provinces in 1997. We find out that the 
correlation coefficient of the GDP per capita and birth rate is -0.73524, and that 
of the GDP per capita and natural population growth rate is -0.73373. They are 
highly negatively correlated. 
In short, the population policy was effective in terms of reaching population 
targets and lowering the fertility rate. Notwithstanding the success in controlling 
population growth, the population policy seems to have generated some perverse 
side effects which will be discussed in the next section. 
9 Banister (1987) finds out the economic rewards from signing the one-child pledge in the 
countryside were so much less than those in cities. 
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II.3/ Impacts of the Population Policy on Gender Issue 
The population policy, especially the one-child policy, exerts pressure on 
households as they have to satisfy their son preference within just one child. In 
response to the policy, some households try various means to have sons. They 
may resort to sex-selective abortions and girl abandonment. As a result, the 
population policy not only has impact on population growth, but also has 
.*• 
perversely effects on sex ratio at birth, sex ratio of infant and children mortality, 
girl abandonment and intra-household resource allocation. 
II.3.1/ Sex Ratio at Birth 
We first look at the sex ratio (defined as percentage of males over females) of the 
population shown in table 7. In 1955, the sex ratio was as high as 107.3. This 
ratio remained high in the 1950's and then fell to between 104 - 106 until 1975. 
Between 1975 and 1980, there was no discernible trend. However, after 1981 the 
ratio exhibits a rising trend until 1985. Then the ratio stayed at around 106 to 107 
for about a decade. In 1997，the ratio was 106.3. (Diagram 2) 
The increase in the sex ratio of the total population must be the result of the 
higher population growth of males over females. This in turn might be the result 
of a higher sex ratio at birth. From table 1, we already know that the sex ratio at 
birth has been increasing over time since the early 1980's, and since the mid-
1980's the ratio has been higher than 107, which is the normal sex ratio at birth 
for many countries. (Ma. et al. 1998) It is widely believed that the one-child 
policy increased the sex ratio at birth because of son preference due to the 
patritlineal reason and higher socio-economic status of male. 
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At the regional level, the ratio for counties was higher than that in towns and 
cities meanwhile the ratio in towns was larger than that in cities. (Table 8) This 
may be due to a stronger son preference and less stringent control of family 
planning in rural areas. Table 9 shows the sex ratios at birth by provinces. With 
the exception of Shanghai, Guizhou and Xinjiang, the provincial ratios exceed 
107. It seems that most of the provinces with low sex ratios at birth are inland 
.• 
provinces. The ratios not only are at high levels, but also increase over time. 
Table 10 lists the sex ratio at birth of the 9 most populated provinces over time. 
The ratios increase over time. In other words, if we treat the ratio as one of the 
indicators for gender preference, the situation of gender inequity is getting worse 
over time. Among the 9 provinces, Hubei's ratio increased from 106.9 to 134.6. 
Sex-selective abortion is likely to be one of the main reasons explaining the high 
sex ratios at birth. Table 11 reports the sex ratios of aborted fetuses in the 
southern Zhejiang province in 1993. The ratio is as low as 86.7. If we take 107 as 
a nominal sex ratio at birth, it is difficult to believe that the relative higher rate of 
aborted female fetuses is purely accidental. The picture will be clearer if we look 
at the composition of the sex of surviving children. For families without children, 
the sex ratio of aborted fetuses is 107.9, very close to 107. With only one male 
child, the sex ratio of aborted fetuses is 108.0. With only one female child, the 
sex ratio drastically decreases to 51.0. It seems that there is no gender preference 
in abortion for families with no child or with a son. However, for families with 
only daughters, there is a sexual bias with respect to abortion. It is clear that there 
were sex-selective abortions. 
According to Greenhalgh and Li (1995), since mid-1993, when the rise in the sex 
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ratio was first officially acknowledged, virtually the only policy adopted to 
counteract the trend was the ban on the use of ultrasound B equipment for 
prenatal sex determination. This indicates the fact that the government indeed 
recognized that sex-selective abortions have become a problem. 
II.3.2/ Infant and Child Mortality 
.' 
Table 12 shows the ratio of infant mortality rate between the two sexes over time. 
The "normal" sex ratio among infant deaths is 130 (Johansson and Nygren 1991). 
As shown in table 12，the ratios are below 130 over years. There was a big drop 
in the ratio in 1980 and then it remained at a relatively low level compared to the 
period before 1980, except in 1985. According to the 1990 population census 
data (Gu 1992), the male and female infant mortality rates in 1989 were 3.55 per 
cent and 4.04 per cent respectively, implying that the sex ratio of infant mortality 
rate was 87.8. Gu (1992) observes that the male infant mortality rate fell by 0.33 
per cent and that of female rose by 0.35 per cent compared with the figure in the 
1982 population census. Without the assumption of gender preference and the 
restrictive one-child policy, it is very hard to explain why the male infant 
mortality rate decreased while that of female increased. 
At the province level, the ratios for all provinces in 1981 and 1989 are below 130 
except for Tibet in 1989. (Table 13) Even if we take 100 as the standard, the 
number of provinces with the ratio below 100 increases from 4 to 19 between 
1981 and 1989. If we look at the column of "change overtime" for child 
mortality in table 14，the picture is clearer: the ratios for all provinces decrease 
over time. This means female infant mortality rate improved at a slower rapid 
pace than that of male infants. 
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Let us consider the child mortality rate. Table 13 indicates that the number of 
provinces with a ratio of child mortality rate between the two sexes lower than 
100 rose from 23 in 1981 to 24 in 1989. The ratio in Jiangxi was as low as 66. 
The ratios for all provinces decreased from 1981 to 1989 except for Liaoning, 
Jilin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Qinghai and Xinjiang. Li and Feldman (1996) find out 
.« 
that the provinces with higher female infant and child mortality rate were mainly 
southeast or coastal provinces, such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Anhui and 
Guongdong, or regions with higher socioeconomic development, such as Beijing, 
Shanhai and Liaoning. Provinces with lower socioeconomic development or a 
higher proportion of ethnic minorities had relatively normal sex differences in 
infant and child mortality. 
Table 14 reports the infant mortality rate across different countries. The son 
preference in the Chinese Mainland is obvious. Biologically, the male infant 
mortality is higher than that of female. However, in the Chinese Mainland, the 
female infant mortality was much higher than the male's by 10.1%o. In table 12， 
only the Chinese Mainland and Egypt had the female infant mortality higher than 
the male's. 
II.3.3/ Treatments Towards Male and Female Children 
There are arguments about whether there is sex discrimination in the treatment 
towards children. Wu and Wang (1991) apply the data from a survey of 8 villages 
and towns in Shandong in 1985 to the Cox model to find the relationship 
between the sex of children and the medical treatments they received before 
death. There is no evidence of sex discrimination in receiving medical treatment. 
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However, this contradicts the figures of infant and child mortality rate of the two 
sexes. As stated above, the female infant and child mortality rates have been 
abnormally high relative to that of male. If there was no sex discrimination in the 
treatment towards children, how can we explain the figures? 
As pointed out by Li and Feldman (1996)，although there may not be sex .• 
discrimination in medical treatment as suggested by Wu and Wang (1991)，there 
is more and more evidence pointing to the existence of sex discrimination along 
other dimensions. (See the presentations about breast-feeding in the International 
Seminar on China's 1990 census) According to a survey on 10 provinces in 1992 
(Tian 1993), households invest more in both monetary and non-monetary terms 
in male children than in female children. 
Under the one-child policy or two-child policy, whenever the first child is a girl, 
households may abandon their female child if they would like to preserve the 
chance for another pregnancy to have a son '�. In fact, according to Johnson (1996) 
and Johnson et al. (1998)，more than 90 per cent, of the abandoned children are 
girls. According to a survey of Johnson et al. (1998), when about 60 per cent of 
the abandoned male children are handicapped, the corresponding figure for 
females is eight per cent. Details are summarized in table 15. Most of the 
abandoned girls only have sisters in their families. 88 per cent of the families 
abandoning children in the survey are from rural areas and with agricultural 
household registration. Households in rural areas are allowed to have a second 
child if the first child is a female. So the high percentage of abandoned girls 
'"Abandonment could cause a rise of the sex ratio at birth as most of the abandoned are female 
children and their births may not be recorded by the authorities. If the abandoned are taken to 
welfare centers, they may be counted into census statistics. But it is not a certainty, as some of the 
26 
having only one sister and no brothers (35 per cent) seems to reflect the 
households' desire of having sons. 
In short, the population policy, especially the one-child policy, has caused 
problems like the rising sex ratio at birth, a relatively high female infant and 
child mortality, and a high level of girl abandonment. The increase in sex ratio at 
birth will also cause a shortage of women in the marriage market in the 
foreseeable future. This may result in large-scale bride-buying and migration as 
men seek marriage partners. The problem of prostitution and criminal issues such 
as rape and abduction may become more serious too. 
abandoned children in welfare centers may not get residential registrations. (See Johnson 1996) 
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II.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we reviewed the history of the family planning policy in the 
Chinese Mainland since 1949. Although the population control policy was 
promulgated since the 1950's, it was not consistently implemented before 1970's 
due to political reasons. In 1979, as the huge and rapidly growing population 
became a burden to the "four modernization" program, the government 
implemented the one-child policy in order to reduce fertility and slow down the 
population growth. Since then, the government has exerted a lot of effort in that 
direction. With the emphasis on socioeconomic factors since the mid-1980's, the 
population policies have been successful in terms of meeting population targets 
and reducing the total fertility rate. 
However, the population policy engenders problems related to gender preference, 
e.g. rising sex ratio at birth, higher mortality rate for female infant and an 
increase in the number of girl abandonment. The high sex ratio at birth and 
mortality rate for female infant will result in imbalance of the two sexes and 
cause problems in the future. Higher girl abandonment itself is a serious form of 
sex discrimination as abandonment could cause causality. 
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Diagram 1 Total Fertility Rate in the Chinese Mainland 
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Diagram 2 Sex Ratio in the Chinese Mainland 
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Table 3 Total Population, Birth Rate, Death Rate and Natural Growth 
Rate of the Chinese Mainland 
Year Total population Birth rate {%c) Death rate (%o) Natural 
(Year end) (10,000 growth rate 
persons) (%o) 
~ ~ 1 ^ 57482 37.00 17.00 20.00 
1957 64653 34.03 10.80 23.23 
" 1 9 6 2 67295 37.01 10.02 26.99 
1965 72538 37.88 9.50 28.38 
1970 82992 33.43 7.60 25.83 
1975 92420 23.01 7.32 15.69 
1978 96259 18.25 6.25 12.00 
1980 98705 18.21 6.34 11.87 
1985 105851 21.04 6.78 14.26 
1986 107507 22.43 6.86 15.57 
1987 109300 23.33 6.72 16.61 
1988 111026 22.37 6.64 15.73 
1989 112704 21.58 6.54 15.04 
1990 114333 21.06 6.67 14.39 
1991 115823 19.68 6.70 12.98 
1992 117171 18.24 6.64 11.60 
1993 118517 18.09 6.64 11.45 
1994 119850 17.70 4.49 11.21 
1995 121121 17.12 6.57 10.55 
1996 122389 16.98 6.56 10.42 
1997 123626 16.57 6.51 10.06 
1998 124810 16.03 6.50 9.53 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1999 
See Appendix 1 for the definitions of birth rate, death rate and natural growth rate. 
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Table 4 Total Fertility Rate in the Chinese Mainland 
Year Total fertility rate Year Total fertility rate 
1 ^ 9 ^ wfA 4T7 
1950 5.81 1975 3.57 
1951 5.70 1976 3.24 
1952 6.47 1977 2.84 
1953 6.05 1978 2.72 .* 
1954 6.28 1979 2.75 
1955 6.26 1980 2.24 
1956 5.85 1981 2.63 . 
1957 6.41 1982 2.86 
1958 5.70 1983 2.42 
1959 4.30 1984 2.35 
1960 4.02 1985 2.20 
1961 3.29 1986 2.42 
1962 6.02 1987 2.59 
1963 7.50 1988 2.52 
1964 6.18 1989 2.35 
, 1965 6.08 1990 2.31 
1966 6.26 1991 2.20 
1967 5.31 1992 2.00 
1968 6.45 1993 1.98 
1969 5.72 1994 1.94 
1970 5.81 1995 1.87 
1971 5.44 1996 1.86 
1972 4.98 1997 1.82 
1973 4.54 1998 1.76 
Source: 1949-1990: Wang (1999); 1991-1992: Gu and Roy (1995); 1993-1998: 
calculated by Qiao (1999) 
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Table 5 Birth Rate, Death Rate and Natural Growth Rate of Cities 
and Counties of PRC 
Year Cities Counties 
Birth rate Death rate Natural Birth rate Death rate Natural 
(%o) (c) growth rate (%c) (c) growth rate 
(%c) (%c) 
1957 44.48 ^ 36.01 32.81 rT07 21.74 
1962 35.46 8.28 27.18 37.27 10.32 26.95 
1965 26.59 5.69 20.90 39.53 10.06 29.47 
1970 - - - - - -
1975 14.71 5.39 9.32 24.17 7.59 16.58 
1978 13.56 5.12 8.44 18.91 6.42 12.49 
1980 14.17 5.48 8.69 18.82 6.47 12.35 
1985 - - - - - -
1986 - - - - - -
1987 - - - - - -
1988 - - - - - -
1989 16.73 5.78 10.95 23.27 6.81 16.46 
1990 16.14 5.71 10.43 22.80 7.01 15.79 
1991 15.49 5.50 9.99 21.17 7.13 14.04 
1992 15.47 5.77 9.70 19.09 6.91 12.18 
1993 15.37 5.99 9.38 19.06 6.89 12.17 
1994 15.13 5.53 9.60 18.84 6.80 12.04 
1995 14.76 5.53 9.23 18.08 6.99 11.09 
- 1996 14.47 5.65 8.82 18.02 6.94 11.08 
1997 14.52 5.58 8.94 17.43 6.90 10.53 
1998 13.67 5.31 8.36 17.05 7.01 10.04 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1999 
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Table 6 Total Population and Birth Rate, Natural Growth Rate and 
GDP by Region (1997) 
Region Total Birth rate (%c) Natural GDP p e r ^ 
population growth rate capita 
(Year end) {%c) (Renminbi) 
(10,000 
persons) 
一 ~ B e i j i n g m O T ^ l L ^ 14598 
Tianjin 953 9.98 3.03 13016 
Hebei 6525 13.11 6.29 6059 
Shanxi 3141 16.18 10.12 4712 
Inner 2326 15.21 8.25 4706 
Mongolia 
Liaoning 4138 11.78 5.40 8434 
Jilin 2628 12.22 6.80 5506 
Heilongjiang 3751 12.02 6.85 7221 
Shanghai 1457 5.50 -1.30 23063 
Jiangsu 7148 11.43 4.59 9346 
Zhejiang 4435 11.41 4.93 10458 
Anhui 6127 15.80 9.30 4358 
Fujian 3282 12.41 6.32 9142 
Jiangxi 4150 17.43 10.87 4133 
Shandong 8785 11.28 4.63 7570 
Henan 9243 13.97 7.67 4413 
- Hubei 5873 14.81 8.12 5875 
Hunan 6465 12.59 5.60 4630 
Guongdong 7051 16.90 11.50 10375 
Guangxi 4633 15.93 9.53 4350 
Hainan 743 19.18 13.56 5516 
Chongqing 3042 13.60 6.24 4438 
Sichuan 8430 15.75 8.75 3938 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 6 - continued 
Region Total Birth rate (%c) Natural GDP per~~ 
population growth rate capita 
(Year end) (%c) (Renminbi) 
(10,000 
persons) 
~~Guizhou 3606 22.15 R 4 8 2 m 
Yunnan 4094 20.82 12.91 4016 
.' 
Tibet 248 23.90 16.00 3104 
Shannxi 3570 13.91 7.62 3714 
Gansu 2494 17.22 11.02 3133 
Qinghai 496 21.80 14.85 4074 
Ningxia 530 18.90 13.47 3980 
Xinjiang 1718 19.66 13.11 6113 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1998 
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Table 7 Sex Ratio of the Chinese Mainland 
Year Sex Ratio (Female =100) Year Sex Ratio (Female =100) 
T ^ I o 7 3 W f i [ ^ 
1956 107.4 1978 106.2 
1957 107.3 1979 106.0 
1958 107.5 1980 106.0 
1959 108.0 1981 106.1 
•1960 107.4 1982 106.3 
1961 105.9 1983 106.5 
1962 105.3 1984 106.7 
1963 105.6 1985 106.9 
1964 105.2 1986 106.8 
1965 104.9 1987 106.9 
1966 105.1 1988 106.9 
1967 105.0 1989 106.9 
1968 105.0 1990 106.8 
1969 104.8 1991 106.8 
1970 105.9 1992 106.9 
1971 105.8 1993 106.4 
1972 105.8 1994 107.0 
1973 105.9 1995 106.4 
1974 105.9 1996 106.4 
1975 106.0 1997 106.3 
1976 106.2 
‘ Source: China Population Statistical Yearbook 1998 (Figures are taken from the annual 
report of the Ministry of Public Security) 
Note: There seems to be some inconsistencies among different data sets. As 
shown in table one, the sex ratio at birth has been larger than 106 since 1972 that 
should have made the overall sex ratio increase overtime. However, the overall 
sex ratio at birth in 1997, 106.3, is very close to that in 1976，106.2. This needs 
further study. 
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Table 8 Sex Ratio at Birth in Cities, Towns and Counties (1994.10.1 一 
1995.9.30) 
Region~~Total births Male Female Sex Ratio (Female =100) 
National 177437 95144 82293 H ^ 
City 29736 15689 14046 111.70 
Town 13465 7226 6239 115.82 
County 134235 72227 62008 116.48 
Source: China Population Statistical Yearbook 1997 (Figures of the 1% Population 
Sample Survey in 1995) 
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Table 9 Sex Ratio at Birth by Region (1994.10.1 - 1995.9.30) 
Region Sex Ratio (Female Region Sex Ratio (Female 
=100) =100) 
National 115.62 Henan 126.68 
Beijing 122.44 Hubei 130.30 
Tianjin 110.47 Hunan 116.40 
Hebei 115.24 Guongdong 123.08 
•• Shanxi 112.01 Guangxi 119.13 
Inner Mongolia 109.98 Hainan 124.47 
Liaoning 111.43 Sichuan 110.05 
Jilin 109.59 Guizhou 99.06 
Heilongjiang 109.96 Yunnan 108.49 
Shanghai 104.84 Tibet 100.69 
Jiangsu 123.42 Shannxi 123.09 
Zhejiang 115.19 Gansu 108.59 
Anhui 116.38 Qinghai 107.14 
Fujian 122.29 Ningxia 107.42 
Jiangxi 115.35 Xinjiang 102.01 
Shandong 118.80 
Source: China Population Statistical Yearbook 1997 (Figures of the 1% Population 
Sample Survey in 1995) 
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Table 10 Sex Ratio at Birth of the 9 Most Populated Provinces in 1982， 
1987，1990 and 1995 
Provinces 1 ^ 1 ^ 1 ^ 1 ^ 
Sex ratio Rank Sex ratio Rank Sex ratio Rank Sex ratio Rank 
at birth at birth at birth at birth 
Chinese 1 ^ - U ^ - U 4 4 - U T 5 - ~ ~ 
Mainland 
Hubei 106.9 9 10.5 9 109.5 9 134.6 1 
Henan 110.3 3 117.4 1 116.6 1 125.2 2 
Jiangsu 107.8 7 113.6 4 114.5 3 125.1 3 
Anhui 112.4 1 114.8 2 110.4 8 118.8 4 
Shandong 109.8 4 114.5 3 115.9 2 118.2 5 
Hunan 107.6 8 108.3 8 110.4 7 116.6 6 
Guangdong 110.4 2 108.4 7 111.7 5 115.8 7 
Hubei 108.1 5 113.1 5 112.3 4 115.6 8 
Sichuan 107.9 6 110.7 6 111.5 6 111.4 9 
Source: Yan, Mao and Lu(1999) 
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Table 11 Sex Ratio of Aborted Fetuses by Number and Sex of Surviving 
Children: Southern Zhejiang Province, 1993 
Surviving children Total Male fetuses Female fetuses Sex ratio of 
Male Female aborted aborted aborted aborted fetuses 
0 0 4 ^ 2345 2 m 107.9 
1 0 2559 1329 1230 108.0 
0 1 3124 1055 2069 51.0 
2+ 0 81 40 41 97.6 
0 2 105 38 67 56.7 
0 3+ 15 4 11 36.4 
1+ 1+ 380 196 184 106.5 
Total 10782 5007 5775 86.7 
Source: Gu and Li (1994) , Sex ratio at birth and son preference in China, Paper 
presented at the U N D P A / K I H A S A International S y m p o s i u m on Issues Related to S e x 
Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing Demographic Dynamics in Asia , 2 1 - 2 4 
November , Seoul , Republic of Korea. (Quoted from Gu and Roy 1995) 
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Table 12 Ratio of Infant Mortality Rate between the Two Sexes from 
1950-1989 





















Source: Li and Feldman (1996) 
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Table 13 Ratio of the Infant and Child Mortality Rate between the Two 
Sexes in Different Regions of the Chinese Mainland in 1981 and 1989 
Region Infant mortality Change Child mortality Change 
ratio over time ratio over time 
^ I m 1 ^ ^ ~ ~ 1 ^ 1989 
^ m ^ ^ a n ^ ^5 ^ a I o " ^ 
Town 107 85 -0.22 96 95 -0.01 
Xian 105 87 -0.18 .90 79 -0.11 
Beijing 109 105 -0.04 111 105 -0.07 
Tianjin 109 104 -0.05 103 83 -0.20 
Hebei 116 98 -0.18 98 93 -0.05 
Shanxi 104 88 -0.16 100 80 -0.20 
Inner 115 94 -0.20 96 85 -0.11 
Mongolia 
Liaoning 116 106 -0.10 94 105 0.11 
Jilin 114 105 -0.10 90 108 0.17 
Heilongjiang 127 115 -0.11 94 92 -0.02 
Shanghai 123 107 -0.16 141 97 -0.45 
Jiangsu 93 92 -0.02 99 100 0.00 
Zhejiang 88 84 -0.04 93 96 0.03 
Anhui 87 86 -0.01 95 88 -0.07 
Fujian 106 90 -0.16 87 79 -0.09 
Jiangxi 101 79 -0.22 74 66 -0.08 
Shandong 100 77 -0.23 94 75 -0.19 
' Henan 97 82 -0.15 96 89 -0.07 
Hubei 110 94 -0.15 95 70 -0.25 
Hunan 109 93 -0.16 87 77 -0.10 
Guongdong 104 85 -0.18 97 75 -0.22 
Guangxi 100 84 -0.16 94 90 -0.04 
Hainan - 85 - - 96 -
Sichuan 102 86 -0.16 86 70 -0.16 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 13 - continued 
Region Infant mortality ratio Change Child mortality Change 
over time ratio over time 
^ 1 ^ Y ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ^ 1 ^ ~ ~ 
Guizhou n o ^ -0.18 ^ 72 ^5H^~" 
Yunnan 117 100 -0.17 92 79 -0.13 
Tibet - 132 - - 100 -
Shannxi 103 86 -0.17 94 80 -0.15 .^  
Gansu 112 94 -0.18 84 70 -0.14 
Qinghai 120 118 -0.01 87 93 0.05 
Ningxia 123 102 -0.21 100 91 -0.09 
Xinjiang 117 112 -0.05 98 113 0.14 
Source: Li and Feldman (1996) 
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Table 14 Infant Mortality Rate (in a year after birth) by Countries in 
1996 with GNP Per Capita Figures 
Country GNP per GNP per capita by Mortality Mortality Mortality 
capita in Purchasing Power rate rate of rate of 
1997, AtIas Parity in 1997 male female 
methodology (International 
(US dollars) dollars) 
High income economics 
Japan 37,850 23,400 ^ 4 J 3 A ~ ~ 
United States 28,740 28,740 7.6 8.3 6.8 
Germany 28,260 21,300 5.0 5.6 4.4 
Netherlands 25,820 21,340 5.7 6.3 5.1 
Australia 20,540 20,170 5.8 6.5 5.0 
Upper middle income economics 
Chile 5,020 12,080 U J f2?7 [ ^ ~ 
Malaysia 4,680 10,920 9.1 10.0 8.1 
Hungary 4,430 7,000 10.9 11.5 10.2 
Mexico 3,680 8,120 16.9 19.0 14.7 
Poland 3,590 6,380 12.2 13.4 10.9 
Venezuela 3,450 8,530 21.4 23.8 18.8 
Lower middle income economies 
^ B e l a r u s 2,150 4,840 f2^6 [ 4 3 1 ^ ~ ~ 
Ecuador 1,590 4,820 29.4 31.5 2.71 
Romania 1,420 4,290 22.3 24.3 20.2 
‘ Kazakhstan* 1,340 3,290 27.7 31.8 23.3 
Morocco 1,250 3,130 17.8 20.4 15.5 
Egypt# 1,180 2,940 36.3 35.3 37.5 
China^ 860 3,570 37.4 32.9 43.0 
Low income economics 
" ^ K y r g y z 440 2,040 Z ^ 3L8 ^ ~ ~ 
Republic* 
Source: 
G N P f igures are from the World Bank database on the Internet 
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Mortality rates, except that of China, are from the Demographic Yearbook 1997 
Mortality rates of China are from the China Population Statistics Yearbook 1998 
Notes: 
* 1995 f igures 
# 1992 f igures 
A 1997 figures; all others are 1996 f igures 
.» 
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Table 15 Birth Order and Sibling Composition of Abandoned Female 
Children 
Only child (first- Brothers Brother(s) Sisters only Total 
born daughter, no only and 1 2 3 4 
brothers) daughter(s) 
Number of fI 4 ^ ^ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ 2 6 ~ ~ 3 ~ ~ ~ [ ^ 
abandoned 
Percent 5.5 2 11 35 32 13 1.5 100 




As a prelude to our econometric analysis of those factors affecting gender bias, it 
is useful to review the literature of gender bias in the Chinese Mainland. Through 
such a review, we hope to identify a set of factors influencing gender bias. There 
are a lot of studies on a wide range of issues pertaining to gender preference. 
This review focuses on those related to the sex of children. This chapter is 
divided into three parts. International experience in the study of gender 
preference is discussed first. Then, the focus is on studies of gender preference in 
the Chinese Mainland followed by a conclusion. 
III.1/ International Experience 
Many studies suggest that the phenomenon of gender bias is not only unique to 
the Chinese Mainland. Indeed, this phenomenon is not confined to Asia, but can 
be found in other places such as North Africa. Researchers find out that gender 
preference is influenced by various factors including economic, social, cultural 
and political elements. These studies provide much valuable information on 
gender preference. 
Initially, gender bias was the subject of demography, sociology and feminist 
studies. Economists started to study the issue since Gary Becker extended the 
field of economic analysis beyond its traditional boundary, to include such 
human behaviors as marriage, birth, divorce, etc. Gary Becker established the 
micro-foundation of the economics of family. He introduces the cost and benefit 
analysis to the demand for children that can easily be extended to the study of 
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gender issues. Adopting this micro-foundation, economists and researchers of 
other disciplines have done a lot of work explaining the reasons behind the 
phenomena of gender preference. 
As quoted by Li (1998), Winston, in his 1932 study, asked 55 male 
undergraduates about their sex preference of children and found out the desired 
male-female ratio was 165. This was the earliest study of gender preference of 
children. Since then, more and more studies have been conducted. Researchers 
have found that there are a lot of reasons behind the phenomenon of gender 
preference. They include education background, income and social status of 
fathers and mothers, religious, cultural factors and even government policies. 
Since those underlying factors vary across different countries, different countries 
have different degrees of gender preferences. Among 31 developing countries, 
Cleland, Verrall and Vaessen (1983) identify four groups in terms of the intensity 
in their desire for the next child to be of a particular sex (quoted from Li 1998). 
As shown in table 16，the four groups are "strong son preference", "son 
preference", "no gender preference" and "daughter preference". Generally 
speaking, countries in the Middle East and South Asia have stronger son 
preference. Southeast Asian countries and countries in the south to Sahara have 
son preference or no gender preference. Latin American countries and Caribbean 
countries have no gender preference (Li 1998). 
The above classification depends on the desired sex of the next child of 
households only. Some studies identify gender preference by such proxies as the 
sex ratio at birth (such as Abeykoon 1995; Park and Cho 1995)，the effects of 
sex-mix of children on fertility (such as Larsen, Chung, and Gupta 1998)，the 
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difference in the treatment towards male and female children (such as Sen 1984), 
human capital investment (Davies and Zhang 1995) and mortality rate between 
the two sexes (such as Murthi, Guio and Dreze 1995; Ram 1984; Rosenzweig 
and Schultz 1982). 
Abeykoon (1995) studies the situation regarding sex preference for sons in four 
South Asian countries, namely Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. He 
finds out that only Sri Lanka has no son preference in general and the gender 
preference in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan is realized through post-natal 
discrimination against female children. The relatively high status of women in 
the society in Sri Lanka is the main reason for the non-existence of son 
preference. 
Park and Cho (1995) find out that there is a close relationship over time between 
the sex ratio at birth and the family size in Korea. The smaller the family size, the 
higher is the sex ratio at birth. The interpretation is that when the family size is 
small, households have greater concern over the sex of their children and will do 
more to control the sex to satisfy their desire of the gender composition of 
children. There seems to be pre-natal discrimination in Korea. They estimate that 
the "missing girls" due to selective abortion may be up to 5 per cent of the actual 
female births. Larsen, Chung and Gupta (1998) find out that Korean women with 
a son are less likely to have another child, and even if they do progress to have 
next child, they take longer to conceive the subsequent child. 
Sen (1984) looks at the issue from the angle of intra-family disparities. Since a 
household is composed of members of a family, the issue of resource allocation 
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within a household exists. According to the data quoted by Sen, men are entitled 
to more calories and protein than women in Matlab of Bangladesh regardless 
age." 
Davies and Zhang (1995) set up a household's utility maximization model with 
bequests and human capital investment on children. With the use of the data from 
a 1989 retrospective survey in five villages in Philippines, they find out that "in 
almost all cases pure preference for male children leads to higher consumption 
for sons than daughters". 
Murthi, Guio and Dreze (1995) use India's data to show that variables related to 
women's agency such as the female literacy rate and the female labor force 
participation rate have a strong negative impact on the female disadvantage. 
Meanwhile, modernization and the general level of economic development of the 
society have no influence on the female-male survival rate. 
Arnold, Choe and Roy (1998) estimate the effects of family composition on 
parity progression and child mortality in India with a hazard model. Their results 
suggest that son preference has an adverse effect on both fertility behaviors and 
sex differentials in child mortality. 
An important reference for this thesis is an article of Rosenzweig and Schultz 
(1982). With the help of child mortality and child survival data in India, they 
build a utility-maximization model on the intra-family resources allocations 
“ T h e study about the mortality of children is a sub-set of the treatment towards children. It is 
because the difference in child mortality is usually associated with how households treat their 
children. Children may die as suffering from malnutrition and lack of care. 
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incorporating both the psychological satisfactions of parents from having 
children and the pecuniary transfer of children to parents. They estimate the 
following econometric equations. 
S = Po + P,E„,+ P2Ef+P3X. + P4X3 + P3 X4+^l 
with 
Pm = S mO + S ml X, + 6 ^ X^ + 6 ^3 X3 + 6 „,4 X4 + 8 ^ 
Ef= 5f0 + (5f, X , + 5 ^ X 2 + ( 5 0 X 3 + 5 f 4 X 4 + £ , 
where, 
S = the difference in levels of sex-specific survival 
Em = the future earnings opportunities of a daughter as a adult 
Ef = the future earnings opportunities of a son as a adult 
X, = vector of variables influencing the demand for adult labor services 
X2 = vector of variables which may act to constrain adult employment 
X3 = vector of wealth, production, or asset variables 
X4 = vector of variables representing educational attainment 
In this model, economic factors influence gender preference in terms of resources 
allocation to sons and daughters. Even without any difference in the 
psychological satisfaction that households derive from sons as opposed to 
daughters, the survival rate may still be different for the two sexes. h\ so far as 
the pecuniary transfer from a son is different from that of a daughter, the 
resources distributed to sons and daughters would still be different. Applying 
rural India's data to the econometric model, the authors find out that the survival 
rate of female children is positively related to the expected contribution of a 
daughter to the family, indicated by female employment in the model. The 
survival rate of female children is also positively related to the proportion of 
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urban area in the district but negatively related to the land ownership. 
Based on this model, Ram (1984) analyzes the gender issues across 118 countries. 
According to his econometric findings, the females' employment is negatively 
correlated to the male-female survival difference in developing countries and the 
male participation rate is positively correlated with the male-female survival 
difference in industrialized countries. 
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III. 2/ Studies of Gender Preference in the Chinese Mainland 
In the Chinese Mainland, the sex ratio at birth has risen since the economic 
reform. It has attracted many researchers to study gender preference and the 
reasons behind it. A lot of reasons have been given, such as the female labor 
participation rate, women literacy, economic development, health care provision 
and cultural reasons. The following section reviews the findings of previous 
studies on China's gender bias in so far as they are relevant to our empirical 
analysis. 
III.2.1/ Cost and Benefit of Having Children 
Some studies look into the costs and benefits of having children in the Chinese 
Mainland. Xu (1996) discusses that the amount of support provided by sons is 
higher than that by daughters. The monetary support from a son is 95.4 Renminbi 
while that from a daughter is just 65 Renminbi.'^ With the estimated result of the 
logit model, Xu points out that whether they are living with their parents is the 
most important factor determining whether a son will support his parents or not. 
Other factors include marital status, employment in stated owned enterprises, the 
income differences between the son and parents and son's education level. 
Factors determining whether a daughter will support her parents include marital 
status, employment in stated owned enterprises, the income difference between 
the daughter and parents and the number of children of the parents. According to 
Xu whether living with parents is the most important factor determining the 
amount of contribution a son making to their parents. This is also true with 
respect to daughters. Besides, the higher is the income of a son (a daughter), the 
greater is his (her) support to the parents. 
'2 Authors did not state the unit of time reference. 
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With the data of a survey conducted in 1992 about the families' economic 
situation and fertility in 10 provinces, Tian (1993) discovers that the investment 
of households in a son (both monetary and non-monetary) is higher than that in a 
daughter while the monetary contribution of a male child is more than that of a 
female child. On the cost side, the monetary investment toward a son in school is 
871 Renminbi while it is 859 Renminbi for a daughter in school. In terms of non-
monetary investment, the average number of days of a household spent on a son 
in school is 15 while they only spent 5 days on a daughter in school ' \ On the 
benefits side, son's contribution almost doubles the contribution of a daughter." 
Tian states that the amount of investment towards children reflects the gender 
preference of households. 
Using the data from a survey conducted in some villages in Xian Yang of 
Shaanxi in 1995, Zhu and Zhang (1996) finds out that the direct cost of having a 
son is higher than that of a daughter. Table 17 lists the direct costs. Here, direct 
cost means monetary expenditure on the child. While bearing and rearing a son 
up to the age 16 costs 30261 Renminbi, a daughter costs 27771 Renminbi. In 
other words, the cost of having a daughter is 8 percent less than that of a son. 
In short, according to these studies, both the cost and benefits of having a son is 
higher than that of a daughter. 
13 Authors did not state the unit of time reference. 
i4The contribution of a male child is more than that of a female child by 119 Renminbi annually. 
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III.2.2/ Sex Ratio at Birth 
As shown before, the sex ratio at birth has risen quite rapidly, especially since 
1985. The ratio is also quite high comparing to other countries. Park and Cho 
(1995) and Gu and Roy (1995) find out that, in the Chinese Mainland, Taiwan 
and South Korea, the sex ratios at birth increase with the decrease in the total 
fertility rates. (Table 2) In other words, the sex ratio at birth is negatively related 
to family sizes in all three places. Moreover, the higher the birth order, the higher 
is the sex ratio at that birth order. The above authors suggest that as the family 
size decreases, the desired gender composition of a family has to be reached with 
respect to a smaller number of children. Thus the son preference has a more 
obvious influence on the sex ratio at birth. The relationship between the birth 
order and sex ratio at birth can hardly be explained by biological reasons. It 
seems that some households resort to artificial methods such as sex-choice 
technology to get the desired sex of their children. Li and Monica Gupta (1999) 
compare sexual discrimination and the survival situation of female children in 
the Chinese Mainland, India and Korea. They find out that the overall sex ratio in 
India is lower than that of the Chinese Mainland and Korea as the southern part 
of India does not have a son preference. However, in the northern part of India, 
there is strong son preference that can be reflected in the high mortality rate of 
female children. The increase in the sex ratio in these three countries since the 
1980，s reflects the use of sex-selective technology. They also point out that 
economic development and improvement in living standards do not necessarily 
reduce the son preference. A case in point is South Korea. 
The increase in the ratio has been studied by a lot of researchers (such as Gu and 
Roy 1996; Li, Y. P. 1993b; Ma 1994; Hull 1990; Yan, Mao and Lu 1999). All of 
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them agree that the sex ratio at birth is too high, compared to the standard in 
many countries of 107’ and there is gender preference in the Chinese Mainland. 
But they do not all agree on the reasons behind such a high level. There are two 
proposed channels, namely underreporting of births and sex-selective abortion. 
///.2.2.7/ Underreporting 
Some researchers discover that there are serious problems in population statistics. 
Bao (1993) uses the findings of a survey team on the issue of accuracy of birth 
statistics to show that among the town and villages surveyed in the project, 14.9 
per cent of them have rates of underreporting exceeding 10 per cent. (Table 18) 
28.16 per cent of the underreporting were deliberate while 47.12 per cent were 
attributable to mistakes or errors. Does this kind of practice influence the 
statistics of the sex ratio at birth? That is, is the problem of underreporting of 
female births more serious than that of male births? According to Gao's 
estimation (1993), based on the population statistics in 1989，1990 and the one 
per cent sample of the 1990 population census, the underreporting rates of male 
and female children in 1989 are 1.98 per cent and 4.2 per cent respectively. The 
sex ratio at birth in 1989 should be adjusted down from 114.07 to 111.48. 
According to the estimation of Tu (1993), the underreporting rates for male and 
female births in 1989 are 1.8 per cent and 5.1 per cent respectively, and the sex 
ratio at birth should be down to 110.8. According to Zeng et al. (1993), the 
underreporting rate for female births more than doubled that of male births in the 
1980's. The estimated sex ratios at birth are reported in table 19. They argue that 
ha l f to 3/4 o f the abnormally high sex ratio at birth is due to underreporting. They 
said that households are willing to bear the penalty of out-of-plan birth in so far 
as the newly born is a boy who can continue the family line. They are not willing 
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to report the out-of-plan female births. 
However, a survey in the Tian Men city of Hubei province shows that under very 
intensive monitoring to avoid underreporting, the sex ratio at birth was 155.75 in 
1994，higher than 131 recorded in the 1990 population census.'^ Yan, Mao and 
.Lu (1999) quote a survey in the Xian Ning area of Hubei province showing that 
77 per cent of underreported births are male. The survey argues that people are 
not willing to report male births because they would like to have more than one 
child. Under the one-child policy, people who reported their first child as male 
are not allowed to have a second child. 
As the evidences are quite contradictory, it is hard to take side. First, the 
estimations of Gao (1993), Tu's (1993) and Zeng et al. (1993) are based on such 
data as the one per cent sample tabulation of the 1990 population census, which 
itself may also be subject to the problem of underreporting. What can be sure is 
that there are inconsistencies among data, even within a survey. Second, although 
a small sample should be more reliable as it is easier to control the quality, we do 
not know whether the situations in Tian Men city and Xian Ning city are really 
representative of the entire Chinese Mainland. Nevertheless, one point is clear — 
even if we agree that underreporting of female birth is more serious than that of 
male births, this does not explain the whole story of the sex ratio at birth. For 
example, as shown in table 19, the adjusted sex ratio at birth is 108.8 in 1986, 
still higher than 107. 
III.2.2.2/ Sex-selective Abortion 
15 See Yan, Mao and Lu (1999). 
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If miss-reporting does not seem to be the only reason for the high level of the sex 
ratio at birth, what about sex-selective abortion? In order to let people perform 
sex-selective abortion, they must have the means to know the sex of their 
children before they are born. Ma et al. (1998) state that before the 1980's there 
were some methods to determine a sex of a child before birth, such as blood test 
,for the pregnant woman, but it was expensive, difficult, not popular. They were 
only conducted in a small number of hospitals because only a few technicians 
had such kind of knowledge. In addition, they could only be conducted for purely 
medical reasons. However, Gu and Xu (1994) state that ultrasound B equipment 
for prenatal sex determination was introduced into the Chinese Mainland at the 
end of the 1970's and more than 10,000 units are imported in the 1980's. By the 
mid-1980's, the Chinese Mainland was able to produce the equipment herself. 
According to their estimation, up to 1994, there were more than 100,000 units of 
ultrasound B equipment for prenatal sex determination in the Chinese Mainland. 
They also state that there is a high positive correlation between the amount of 
equipment and the sex ratio at birth across regions. Also, it is believed that the 
implementation of the one-child policy increased the demand for such equipment. 
Ma et al. (1998) use the year 1980 as the watershed for prenatal sex 
determination in the Chinese Mainland. It is shown in table 20 that the overall 
sex ratio at birth in 1980-1988 is higher than that in 1970-1979 by about 2.65. By 
the order of birth, it is obvious that, generally speaking, the higher the order, the 
larger is the gap between the sex ratios of the two periods. 
A lot of studies suggest that sex-selective abortion is the main mechanism 
through which son preference is translated into the high sex ratio at birth in the 
Chinese Mainland. According to a study on birth records in hospitals in 29 
5 8 
provinces of the Chinese Mainland over the period of October 1986 to October 
1987 and January 1988 to December 1991，Li (1994) finds out that "sex-selective 
abortion" and "give birth in hospital when the fetus is male" are the main reasons 
for the high sex ratio at birth, and the higher the birth order the higher is the ratio. 
Gao, Liu, and Xia (1997) use data from the 1990 Fourth Population Census and 
the 1995 One Percent Population Sample survey to examine the changes in sex 
ratio at birth in Beijing. They find out that sex-selective abortion is the main 
reason. 
It seems that these practices are common in both cities and rural areas. Li, Y. P. 
(1993a) quotes a study conducted from 1986 to 1987 in 8 provinces by Beijing 
Medical University that the sex ratio of aborted fetuses is 94.6 in cities and 96.8 
in rural areas. Both are lower than 103-107, the usual sex ratio at birth. 
In short, the problem of the high sex ratio at birth is serious in the Chinese 
Mainland. Second, there is a problem regarding the accuracy of population 
statistics that causes difficulties in analyzing sex ratio at birth and related issues 
like gender preference. Third, sex-selective abortion seems to be one of main 
channels translating son preference into a high sex ratio at birth. 
III.2.3/ Mortality, Conditions for Households to Sign One-child Certificates 
and Other Related Studies 
With the help of data from the one per cent sample tabulation of the 1990 
population census, Han and Li (1999) conclude that the mortality risk for female 
children is significantly higher than that for male children. They use the infant 
mortality rate as the dependent variable and apply the data to a Cox model to 
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analyze the factors influencing child mortality rate. Estimated results show that 
the child mortality rate positively correlates with families that are extended 
families'^ Han in nationality, with a less educated mother, in the agricultural 
sector and without a son. For the female children in the second or higher birth 
order and having no brother, their mortality rate is much higher. 
Some researchers discover that there is gender bias towards sons when they 
analyze the reasons for households to sign one-child certificates. (Arnold and Liu 
1986; Zhang and Spencer 1992; Li and Cooney 1993) After signing a one-child 
certificate, households are given substantial benefits including a child allowance 
that continues until the child is 14 years old, priority access to school, hospitals, 
housing, pensions and access to more land in rural areas. If households violate 
the one-child restriction, they are penalized, possibly leading to a 10 per cent to 
20 per cent reduction in income for 7 years. (Zhang and Spencer 1992) 
Researchers find out that if a household already has a son, the household is more 
likely to sign a one-child certificate. Households without a son are less willing to 
sign it, which is an indication of son preference. Zhang (1994) finds out that son 
preference has little effect on the timing of signing a one-child certificate and 
suggests that its effect may through other factors such as education and income to 
take place. 
Researchers in other studies, such as fertility in the Chinese Mainland and the 
effects of the one-child policy on the second and third births, also find some 
evidence of the existence of son preference. Larsen (1990), Zhang and Spencer 
(1992), Li and Cooney (1993)，Ahn (1994)，Qian (1997) and Li and Choe (1997) 
16 Extended family means there are children, parents and grand parents in a family. 
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find out that households where the first child is female are more likely to have a 
second child. Zhang (1990, 1994) find out that there is a stopping rule, i.e., after 
having a certain number of boys, households will stop childbearing. They are 
also less likely to use contraceptives after the birth of their first child. (Li and 
Cooney 1993) 
.• 
A lot of studies support the existence of son preference in the Chinese Mainland. 
However, the situation in some areas has changed. According to the family 
planning committee in Jiaozhaou city (1997)，the city launched a program called 
"Three one one" ("San yi yi") in 1991 to tightly monitor the situation of pregnant 
women and child bearing in families. This program helped to reduce sex-
selective abortion and children abandonment. Since then the sex ratio at birth fell 
from over 120 in the late 1980's to 106 in 1995. The situation changed not only 
because of tighter control, but possibly also because of economic development, 
better education of females and raised women's status. Son preference in certain 
areas seems to be decreasing. Wang (1994) finds out that more women in Beijing 
prefer daughters rather than sons regardless of the order of birth. So, the degree 
of son preference can be reduced with a change in economic and social factors. 
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III.3/ Conclusion 
There are a lot of studies about gender preference. If indices like sex ratio at birth 
or relative survival rate of male and female children are regarded as indicators 
for gender preference, studies shows that gender preference is influenced by 
economic, social, cultural factors and even family sizes (such as Rosenzweig and 
Schultz 1982; Park and Cho 1995). With regard to the studies in the Chinese 
Mainland, some authors use statistics to discover the existence of son preference 
such as using sex ratio at birth (such as Gu and Roy 1996; Yan, Mao, and Lu 
1999)，infant and child mortality (such as Johansson and Nygren 1991; Li 1999), 
and treatment towards male and female children (such as Wu and Wang 1991). 
Some studies analyze the cost and benefits of having children (such as Tian 1993; 
Xu 1996). Some studies find the existence of son preference and discover factors 
affecting it when they use econometrics models to tackle other issues such as 
fertility (such as Larse 1990; Zhang and Spencer 1992) and the conditions for 
signing one-child certificates (such as Arnold and Liu 1986; Zhang and Spencer 
1992). These studies provide a lot of valuable information on gender preference 
in the Chinese Mainland. They provide evidence of the existence of son 
preference and relate the phenomenon to various factors such as nationality, 
education of mothers and whether working in the agricultural sector. 
Despite the large literature on gender bias, very few studies employ rigorous 
econometric models to study the factors affecting gender bias in the Chinese 
Mainland. What we have in mind is the study by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) 
who use the relative survival rate of male and female children in India, which can 
be regarded as a proxy for gender bias, as the dependent variable to determine 
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statistically the factors underlying it. The subsequent chapter introduces an 
economic model similar in spirit to the study of Rosenzweig and Schultz. 
•象 
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Table 16 Gender Preference among 31 Developing Countries 
Strong son Son preference No gender Daughter 
preference preference preference 
Pakistan Lesotho Kenya Venezuela 
Mauritius Sri Lanka Indonesia Jamaica 
Nepal Sudan Peru 
Bangladesh Morocco Guyana 
Korea Thailand Trinidad and Tobago 
Syria Fiji Colombia 
Yemen Malaysia Paraguay 
Egypt Dominica Costa Rica 
Jordan Mexico Panama 
Philippines 
Haiti 
Source: Cleland, Verrall and Vaessen 1983，Preferences for the Sex of Children and 
their Influence on Reproductive Behavior. (Quoted from Li 1998) 
Table 17 Direct Cost of Having a Son and a Daughter 
(in term of Renminbi) 
Sex \ period During Age 0 - 3 Age 3 - 6 Age 7 - 16 Total 
pregnancy 
- ^ 1 ¾ ^ f m 2 I ^ 30261*~~ 
Daughter 1080 2839 3469 17350 27771* 
Source: Zhu and Zhang (1996) 
* Including the penalty for out-of-plan birth, 339 Renminbi per birth. 
Direct cost means all the monetary expenditure on the child. 
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Table 18 Number of Towns and Villages Underreporting Birth Data 
Year Underreporting rate 
Below 5 % ~ ~ 5 % -10%~~About 10% Overall~~ 
1 ^ 27 B [0 ^ 
1989 25 21 6 52 
1990 29 10 9 48 
1991 28 14 7 49 
•. 
Source: Bao(1993) 
Table 19 Estimated Sex Ratio at Birth 
Year Reported sex ratio at birth Estimated sex ratio at birth 
1983 i ^ [ ^ 
1984 108.3 106.5 
1985 111.2 107.8 
1986 112.1 108.8 
Jan 1987 - Jun 1988 110.0 107.0 
Jan 1989-Jun 1990* 111.4 107.6 
Jan 1989-Jun 1990** 115.4 111.4 
Source: Zeng et al. (1993). 
Figures from 1983 to Jan 1987 - June 1988 are calculated from the Two-per-Thousand 
National Fertility Survey in 1988. 
* Calculated from the 10% computer tabulation of the 1990 population census. 
** Calculated from the 1% sample tabulation of the 1990 population census. 
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Table 20 Sex Ratio at Birth according to the Order of Birth 
Year Overall V' order 2"" order 3'^  order 4'^  order 5^ ' and above 
order 
1970-1979 106.31~~106.84 104.45 105.89 107.29 107.50 
1980-1988 108.96 105.49 110.83 113.94 114.13 115.64 
Source: Ma et al.(1998) 
•• * Data is calculated from the Two-per-Thousand National Fertility Survey in 1988. 
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Chapter IV 
Methodology and data 
In the last chapter, we reviewed previous studies about gender preference 
especially in the Chinese Mainland. In this chapter, we first introduce the 
theoretical framework of gender preference from the economic perspective. 
.' 
Second, within this framework, we build two econometric models to help 
analyze the gender preference in the Chinese Mainland. Then we will discuss the 
data set. 
IV.1/ Theoretical framework 
IV.1.1/ Gender Preference from the Economic Perspective 
In this thesis, we study the determinants of gender bias using ideas in the 
economics of the family first propounded by Gary Becker and many of his 
followers. In the standard neoclassical model, the household chooses its optimal 
bundle of consumption goods by maximizing its utility subject to its budget 
constraint. In a similar vein and within the framework of family economics, the 
demographic composition of a household, e.g., the number of sons and daughters 
in a family, is not just biologically determined, but is the result of the household 
weighing the costs and benefits of having more or less sons or daughters. 
Pioneered by Becker (1991), the most basic model for the demand of children 
postulates a household utility function: 
(1) U = U(n, Z) 
where n is the number of children and Z is a composite consumption good. A 
typical household then chooses the desired n and Z subject to its budget 
6 7 
constraint: 
(2) P„ X n + P, X Z = I 
where P„ is the shadow price of a child, P^ is the price of the composite good and 
I is the income of the household. 
, W h i l e the above simple model assumes that children are consumption goods, it is 
not inconceivable that children are also investment goods whereby parents invest 
in their children when they are young. In return, the children take care of the 
parents at their old age. 
Without trying to build an elaborate model of gender bias, what follows is a 
heuristic account of an extension of the above framework that fumishes the 
foundation for our subsequent econometric analysis. Extending the above 
framework to the study of gender preference, eq. (1) may be modified so that 
(1，） U = U(s, d, Z, SC) 
where s is the number of son, d is the number of daughter and SC is a vector of 
exogenous variables such as social norms, nationalities. A key element of SC in 
the Chinese Mainland is the traditional son preference. In traditional Chinese 
society, only sons can pass on a family's lineage. There is even a phrase in 
traditional Chinese families saying that the most serious sin regarding filial piety 
a son could commit is the failure to propagate the family line. A son is therefore 
more important than a daughter and a family having at least one son is not an 
uncommon desire among Chinese families. The social status of man and woman 
is also important. Given man has a more respected status, e.g., only men are 
allowed to participate in some ancestor worships, the satisfaction of having a son 
will be higher. 
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The budget constraint (eq. 2) may be correspondingly augmented to include 
shadow price of sons (PJ and that of daughters (PJ. Given the income level, the 
price or cost of bearing a child not only limits the consumption level of 
households but also the number of sons and daughters they are able to bear. 
..There are monetary and non-monetary costs in bearing a child. Monetary cost 
includes spending on bearing and feeding a child, such as the expenditure on 
education, food and clothing. Non-monetary cost refers to the potential parental 
earnings that are forgone, due to time taken in bearing, feeding and generally 
taking care of a child. 
Is there any difference in the price or cost of having a son and a daughter? So far 
there are still very few related studies on the Chinese Mainland and the statistics 
available for analysis is not rich. A more fundamental question is whether we can 
collect a realistic figure about the "true" cost. The data we can collect shows the 
monetary spending and hours that households invest in their children. These 
figures itself are influenced by households' gender preference." For example, a 
household with son preference would buy more toys and spend more time on 
them. However, the cost of bearing children in our model is the "true" cost, 
which is free of gender preference. The "true" cost should just reflect the cost 
incurred by biological reasons, e.g., male requires more food to maintain a 
healthy condition. As a result, although figures support both the monetary and 
non-monetary cost of having a male child is higher than that of having a female 
child'^ we should not take it as the "true" cost. What we know is, the investment 
17 As Tian, X. Y. (1993) said, the amount of investment towards children reflects the gender 
preference of households. 
“ S e e Tian (1993), Shi (1995) and Zhu and Zhang(1996). 
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households are willing to invest on a son is larger than that on a daughter, not the 
cost of rearing them. There are no solid statistics supporting the premise that the 
cost of having a male child is higher than that of having a female one. However, 
as male children in rural areas have to help families with agricultural work while 
female children perform housework, a male child may costs more in food 
..consumption as the energy used is probably higher than that of a female child. 
If a child also contributes to the income of the family (I, for the expected income 
contribution of a son and 1^  for that of a daughter), then parent's income "I" will 
have to be suitably augmented. These incomes are defined as money derived 
from service and income provided by the child. Services include housework and 
sideline done by the child in his / her childhood. Of course, the guarantee of 
income during the parents' old age is also an important service provided by 
children. 
There is evidence supporting the view that the return from male children to 
families is higher than that of female children. The total amount of income return 
from all children to a family, labeled it as I„ may be divided into three 
components, namely the number of children, n, the income of children, I„, and 
the proportion of a son's or daughter's income that he or she gives to their 
parents, let it be v. 
I , = ^ V i I j i = l , 2 , 3 . . . n 
(=1 
where i indicating the order of children, 1^  is the income of child at 产 order and v, 
is the proportion of the income of child at 产 order giving to the household 
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The income of females is less than that of males in the Chinese Mainland (Gu 
1994，Lai 1998). However, we do not have data about what proportion of income 
of males and females give to their parents, v；. Some surveys do give data about 
the amount of income children contribute to their parents. The contribution of a 
, m a l e child is normally more than that of a female child. (Tian 1993, Xu 1996) 
One study even shows that a son's contribution almost doubles the contribution 
of a daughter. (Tian 1993) While these are just regional samples, in most cases, 
parents are living with their sons in the Chinese Mainland and so their livelihood 
is largely dependent on their sons. These findings are probably universal in the 
Chinese Mainland. 
There is a lack of data and it is difficult to convert housework into monetary 
terms. There is no solid data to compare the value of services provided by a male 
child and a female child. However, it is worth noticing that households may not 
regard housework as important as outside work, such as working in factory or the 
agricultural sector. This is because its output is not evaluated in the market. 
Households may regard it as a duty rather than as a contribution with monetary 
value, especially in less developed areas. Female children contribute more to 
housework than male children do. So, in rural areas, from a household's 
perspective, the value of services provided by a son may be higher than that 
provided by a daughter. Therefore, it is very likely that the monetary benefit of 
having a son is higher than that of having a daughter. 
Concerning non-monetary benefit, which directly influences the utility function 
and is not included in I, or I ,^ children provide psychological satisfaction to 
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households and its level of satisfaction depends on cultural and social factors 
stated above. With the traditional Chinese son preference, the psychological 
satisfaction of having a son is probably higher than that of having a daughter. 
In our models, P„ P^, 1^  and 1^  are grouped together as a vector E of economic 
.factors. 
In so far as population policies restrict the choice of household (e.g., the one 
child policy), additional constraints may be included. In less developed and 
highly populated areas such as India and China, population policy is not 
uncommon. Population policy may be implemented by various means, such as 
economic incentive and punishment, education, social pressure, supply of 
contraceptives and even compulsory abortion. Thus, population policy influences 
households' desired number of sons and daughters not only by imposing a legal 
constraint, but also through changing the budget constraint, by the monetary 
benefit and cost, and the utility function, by peer and social pressure. Therefore, 
population policy (PP) is included. 
Solving the above model, the demand for sons and daughters then depend on the 
factors discussed above (i.e. E, SC, PP). In so far as we can construct some 
proxy for gender bias cp (s, d) which in turn depends on "s" and "d", then, 
(3) <^(s, d) = f(E, SC, PP) 
where 
E = vector of variables reflecting the monetary and non-monetary costs of child 
rearing and their benefits 
SC = vector of variables summarizing the effects of culture and social norms 
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PP = vector of proxies for population policies 
We are going to construct proxies for E, SC, PP in the sections for econometrics 
models. 
‘ To sum up, gender preference depends on economic, social and cultural factors 
and population policies. If the desired number of sons does not equal to that of 
daughters, we said the household has a gender preference. So, if the desired 
number of sons is greater than that of daughters, the household has a son 
preference. Equation (2) is used to analysis gender preference. 
In this study, we are more interested in the economic factor and the impact of the 
population policy. We are going to construct two econometric models to look at 
the following issues: 
1) Do households have gender preference concerning the sex of their children? 
2) What are the factors influencing gender preference? 
3) What is the impact of the population policy in the Chinese Mainland on 
gender preference? 
As stated in the literature review, previous studies have analyzed gender 
preference as a by-product when they use econometric models to analyze fertility, 
likelihood of having a second child, the interval between births and willingness 
to sign one-child certificates in the Chinese Mainland. Other empirical studies 
have used such proxies as sex ratio at birth and child mortality rate to show the 
existence of gender preference. In the subsequent discussion, we use a more 
direct approach to tackle the issue using indicators for gender preference as the 
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dependent variables. Two econometric models are constructed to examine the 
impacts of the various factors on gender bias. This thesis uses data from Gansu 
province collected in the second phase of the Chinese Mainland In-depth Fertility 
Survey. (See section IV.2 for more detail) 
.' 
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IV.1.2/ Econometrics Models 
Based on the theoretical reasoning in the previous section, we are going to 
construct two econometric models to analyze gender bias in the Chinese 
Mainland. To explain the motivations behind these two models, it is perhaps 
useful to decompose the process of a birth into 3 parts: desires, means and 
. .outcome. Desires refer to the household's longing for a son or a daughter. 
Desires for a son or a daughter may be influenced by a lot of factors that will be 
discussed below. Given the desires, households need means to fulfill it. The 
means to achieve the desired composition of children can be classified into three 
types, namely before pregnancy, during pregnancy and after birth. Before 
pregnancy, some Chinese may try certain medicine to have the ‘right sex' of the 
future birth. During pregnancy, people may identify the sex of baby and if it is 
not the 'right sex' the parent may abort the baby. Ultrasound B equipment for 
prenatal sex determination is now commonly used in the Chinese Mainland as a 
feasible and reliable mean. After birth, parents could abandon the child or adopt 
a child to adjust the number of sons and daughters. Households could adjust the 
number of sons and daughters and their ratio by having more children. This is 
more effective when the gender preference is in the form of having at least one 
child with a specified sex, such as a son. We are not going to find out what is the 
most common means people use to control the sex at birth. Instead, we test 
whether people have the means, no matter which means, to control the sex at 
birth. 
Keeping the above discussion in mind, the first model examines the factors that 
contribute to the desire with respect to the preference of sex of the next birth. The 
result of this model would give answer to what the factors influencing gender 
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preference and its effects are. In the second model, we try to identify the factors 
contributing to the actual difference in the number of sons and daughters in a 
family. The second model is different from the first one, as the dependent 
variable is no longer an "intention" about gender preference, the desired sex of 
the next child. It is the actual number of sons and daughters that households have, 
. . w h i c h is partly influenced by the accessibility of means of controlling sex of 
children. The result of the second model should provide the information on 
factors influencing gender preference in term of the actual difference in the 
number of sons and daughters, and whether population policies have any impact. 
In both models, the household is regarded as a rational decision making unit. 
IV.1.2J/Modell 
In the second phase of the Chinese Mainland In-depth Fertility Survey, 
households were asked about the desired sex of the next birth. We use this as the 
dependent variable in the econometric model. If we can find a significant 
relationship between the desired sex of the next birth and independent variables, 
then, first, the households' desired sex of children is not random. Second, the 
desired sex of the next child relates to various factors like economics and 
population policy. 
Some of the previous analysis concerning gender preference or fertility (such as 
Zhang and Sturm 1994; Li and Choe 1997; Larsen et al. 1998) focus on the 
second birth. However, the gender of the second birth or any order of births may 
not only reflect the gender preference of a household as it is also influenced by 
biological effects if the household does not use such effective means as sex 
selective abortion to control the sex of its children. A household's desired sex of 
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the next birth purely reflects the gender preference of that household with a 
minimum of noise. This is the reason why we use it as the dependent variable in 
the first model. 
As the dependent variable is a discrete one and there are three choices, we use a 
multinomial logit modeP to examine the influences of different variables on the 
preference of the sex of the next birth. The theoretical framework of the 
multinomial logit model is the same as the logit model. The only difference is 
that there are more than two choices in the dependent variable, rather than two. 
In our model, there are three choices: (1) no preference in the sex of the next 
birth, (2) the desired sex of the next birth is male (3) and the desired sex of the 
next birth is female. ®^ 
In multinomial logit model, it is assumed that the probability follows a logistic 
distribution^': 
D … ， • � e x p ( > ^ ' X j 
(4) Prob(Y, = J) = z ^ e x p ( ^ ; x ) where k = 0 ,1’ or 2 
where 
j and k are the alternatives in the choice, 
Yi is the alternative chosen by individual i, 
19 The foundation of logit model is discussed in more detail in Appendix 2. Moreover, the use of 
multinomial logit model may involve the issues ofIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). 
If it is the case, the odds ratio, Prob(Yi=j)yT>rob(Yi=k) are not independent to other alternatives 
and the estimates will be inefficient but will not lead to inconsistency. An ordered multinomial 
logit model be may an alternative as IIA is irrelevant to it. 
2�The three choices are regarding the desire ofhouseholds for the sex oftheir next child and 
those choices are mutually exclusive. 
21 Multinomial Probit model is also capable of discrete dependent variable, but due to the 
relatively complicated probability distribution, most researchers prefer the logit model See 
Thomas (1997) and Greene (1990). 
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Yj = 0 means no special gender preference for the next birth; 
= 1 means the desired sex of the next birth is male; 
= 2 means the desired sex of the next birth is female, 
p = a vector of coefficients of independent variables, 
Xj = a vector of independent variables (i.e. E, SC and PP discussed in the 
previous section). 
The logistic distribution is similar to the normal distribution except at the two 
tails, which are considerably heavier. (Greene 1990) For simplicity, we rewrite 
equation (4) as: 
(4，） P r o b ( Y - j ) = F(P'X) 
The log likelihood, estimated logit model is: 
(5) In L = Z I dj： In Prob(Yi = j) where j = 0，1，2 
i j=0 J 
For each individual, i, d = 1 if alternative j is chosen by the individual i, and 0 
otherwise. 
Recall equation (4'), the predicted probability is F(g'X). Therefore the estimated 
marginal effects are equal to dProb(Y)/dX or F'(fi'X)_g, or f(fi'X)_^. We must be 
careful not to use £ as the vector of estimated marginal effects of the 
corresponding variables. There are three choices in our model, so the estimated 
marginal effect of a variable is the change in the probability with respect to a 
given choice due to a marginal change in the variable. For example, the estimated 
marginal effect of female education level on the choice of having a girl as the 
desired gender of the next birth is 0.04. It means a marginal increase in the 
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female education level increases the probability of a household hoping to have a 
girl for the next birth by 4 per cent. 
In this model, other than E, SC��，the independent variables also include Ch, a 
vector indicating the existing gender composition of children in a family. Ch is 
‘• included because that a household's desired sex of the next child is probably 
influenced by the sex of the children it already has. For example, if the son 
preference is not very strong, a household that already has a son may want to 
have a daughter. If a household already has two or more sons and no daughter, 
the family likely prefers a daughter rather than a son. So, Ch is included to 
identify this. 
As a result, equation (4') can be rewrote as: 
(4") Prob(Yi=j) = F(E, SC, Ch) 
The list of variables and their expected values are in the table 21. Here we 
discuss it one by one. 
IVL2.1a/ Variables in the Vector E 
There are four important variables we would like to discuss first. These are the 
education level and occupation of the wives, and their husbands. We must be 
careful in interpreting the coefficient of education level. Different interpretations 
with respect to the marginal effects of education levels are conceivable. The 
22 In model 1，there is no independent variable indicating the population policy as when the 
survey asked respondents about their desired sex of the next child, it was 1987. All decisions 
about the desired sex of the next child are under the influence of the population policy, esp. the 
one-child policy, which started to implement in 1979. In model 2，there is a variable for the 
population policies. 
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education level of the wives (husbands) may be used as proxies for the expected 
income contribution of a daughter (a son) to the parents respectively (E,- and E J . 
As stated in section IV.1.1，one important variable explaining the desire of 
having sons or daughters is how much their sons and daughters will contribute 
financially to the family. However, in reality, households do not have this 
information, as they do not know their children's income in future and what 
proportions of their children's income will be given to them. What they can do is 
to guess based on available information such as the average wage rate of male 
and female in the society and their own wages. On this matter, previous studies 
tried different proxies for the financial contribution of children. For example, 
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) consider using regional wage rate and 
employment level of both sexes as the proxy."^ An alternative is the wages of the 
women and their husbands.^^ Unfortunately, all the above proxies are not 
available. Without a better choice, education levels of parents are used as the 
proxies in our estimation mode l?�There are, however, caveats with the use of 
education levels as proxies. As stated by Zhang (1990，1994), the education level 
is probably associated with other factors that may influence gender bias. 
Education may instill people with the concept of gender equality and change 
their attitudes towards the equal rights of males and females. Education may 
therefore help reduce one's gender bias. (For the sake of simplicity, we refer to 
this effect of education as the "pure education effect" in the rest of this thesis.) 
This is the reason why we put these variables under both categories of 
23 They finally use regional employment level as the proxy as "wage rates may not accurately 
reflect the shadow value of times because exogenous cultural factor may prevent wives from 
equalizing market and household marginal products" and "agricultural wage rates are not 
available for many districts ofIndia". (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982) 
24 Respondents here mean the respondents of the second phase of the Chinese Mainland In-depth 
Fertility Survey and all of them are women. 
25 In some studies, education is used as a proxy for potential wages. See Zhang(1990, 1994). 
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"economic" and "social and cultural" in table 21. 
At this stage, we expect that the education of women is positively related to the 
probability of hoping the next child to be a girl. This is because, first, as a proxy 
for their daughters' income, the higher the income, the higher the monetary 
, support they guess their daughters will contribute. Secondly, the higher the 
education level of women, the higher is the probability that they accept the 
concept of equal rights for men and women."^ 27 
On the other hand, the impact of the education level of respondents' husbands is 
more complicated. First, the higher the financial contributions of sons, the higher 
is the probability that they hope their next child to be a boy. However, according 
to the pure education effect, with a higher level of education, the probability of 
hoping their next child to be a boy should be lower. Therefore, there are 
counteracting effects and the net effect of the variable can only be empirically 
determined. 
The variables for the occupation'^ of the respondents and their husbands are also 
included as proxies for the expected income contribution of a son and a daughter 
respectively. Generally speaking, the income of non-agricultural work is higher 
than that of agricultural work. This is the reason why a lot of people flow from 
26 Han and Li (1999) find women's education helps to improve the survival rate of female 
children which can be regarded as an indictor for gender preference. 
27 Some literature find that higher the education level of people, the fewer is the number of 
children they would like to have, as higher education level means higher opportunity cost of 
bearing and rearing a child. However, this argument is not relevant to our model as we are using 
the desired sex of next child as the dependent variable, which implicitly assumes they would like 
to have the next birth. In fact, we only include observations that have stated that they would like 
to have a next child. This point will be also discussed in the end of this chapter. 
28 For the dummy variable "respondent works in the non-agricultural sector" and "respondent's 
husband works in the non-agricultural sector", 0 means one is unemployed or works in the 
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rural areas to urban areas to seek jobs in factories each year. As stated above 
about the education levels, parents may use their own income as an estimation 
for the future support of their sons and daughters to them. The estimated income 
for daughters by females working in the non-agricultural sector may be higher 
than that by females working in the agricultural sector. Therefore, respondents 
•. working in the non-agricultural sector should be more likely to desire a daughter 
as their next birth. By the same token, respondents' husbands working in the 
non-agricultural sector should be more likely to desire a son as their next child. 
To capture the income effect on the desired sex of the next birth, we include the 
household annual income and proxy variables, i.e. variables for the ownership of 
durable goods, including washing machine, sewing machine, refrigerator and 
television. Using ownership of durable goods as a proxy for lifetime income is 
supported by the theoretical literature relating to the socio-economic theory of 
fertility behavior (e.g. Zhang, 1990, 1994). We expect income to be positively 
related to the probability of desiring a girl as the next child. This is because rich 
people may be able to pay the penalties for having more children, thereby giving 
room for the births of girls as they need not satisfy their son preference in only 
one or two births. 
IV.L2.1b/ Variables in the Vector Ch 
There are two variables in the vector Ch: (1) "the difference in the number of 
sons and daughters", i.e., s - d, and (2) the dummy variable for households 
without children29. The first variable captures the information of the sex 
agricultural sector, 1 means one works in the non-agricultural sector. 
29 For this dummy variable, 0 means the household has at least one child and 1 means the 
household has no child. 
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composition with respect to the existing children. For example, if there are two 
sons and a daughter, this variable will take the value of one. The reason we do 
not use the number of sons and daughters to replace this variable is that what we 
want to gauge is the effect of sex composition of existing children, not individual 
impact the number of sons and daughters taken separately^®. For example, 
, regardless of whether the composition is "two sons and one daughter" or "only 
one son", our variable will assume the value of one and what we are actually 
interested in is the impact of this difference. However, if the number of sons and 
daughters are equal, the variable will take a value just equal to the case of "no 
children". To avoid this, we introduce the dummy variable “the household 
without living children". We anticipate that: (1) if the number of daughters is 
larger than that of sons, it is more likely that the household would prefer a son as 
the next child and vice versa; (2) given the prevailing son preference, if a 
household has no children, it will prefer a son as the next child. 
IV.1.2.1c/Variables in the Vector SC 
We include the age of respondent and her husband at the time when the data in 
the survey was collected. The aim of including these demographic variables is to 
look at the relationship between age and gender preference. In our expectation, 
younger people should more likely to have modern sense of gender equality than 
older people, and be less influenced by traditional son preference. Therefore, we 
expect younger people will have less son preference and be more likely to desire 
a daughter as their next child than the older people. 
3" There is also a technical issue when we use three dummies, i.e., (1) only has sons, (2) only has 
daughters and (3) has both sons and daughters, lo represent the combination of children. The 
iteration process of the multinomial logit model does not convergent. 
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We also include the nationality of couples to find out whether the more lenient 
population policy towards ethnic minorities has any impact on gender preference 
of next birth. With this unequal degree of restriction of the population policies, 
people with Han nationality are expected to be more likely to desire a son as their 
next child.3i Of course, the traditional view of gender in different ethnic groups 
, may be different and also have impact on our estimations. Unfortunately, we do 
not have any information about it. 
The degree of enforcement of the one-child policy is different in rural as opposed 
to urban areas. This is due to the different costs of enforcement and monitoring, 
since the population is less concentrated and the cost of implementation is thus 
relatively higher in rural areas. The low level of economic development also 
means fewer resources for family planning authorities to implement the policy. 
Banister (1987) pointed out that the economic rewards from signing the one-
child pledge were so much less in countryside comparing to that in cities. So, 
people in rural areas have less incentive to obey the one-child policy and 
therefore may have more children. This gives room for the birth of daughters. 
However, the traditional Chinese preference for sons is relatively strong in rural 
areas. As this preference is so strong, its influence may outweigh the influence of 
relatively lax enforcement of the one-child policy. The inclusion of the places of 
residence, namely, "living in cities" and "living in towns" of the respondents as 
dummy variables in SC is to examine these counteracting effects. The reference 
group pertains to households living in rural areas. 
31 Han and Li (1999) finds women belong to ethnical minority associate with a higher survival 
rate of female children which can be regarded as an indictor for gender preference. 
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The sample in this model only includes observations for married women with a 
desire for future birth. The reason for excluding unmarried women is that the 
decision on the sex of the next child, in most cases, is determined by both 
husband and wife, and the husband's family may also influence the decision. 
Unmarried women are different from married women because their decisions are 
‘. not influenced by their husbands and the husband's family/^^ Besides it is obvious 
that we should not include households that do not desire future children. 
32 We have also run the econometric model including unmarried women. However, this only adds 
one more observation to our sample. The results are listed in Appendix 3. 
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IV.].2.2/ModeI 2 
While model 1 looks into those factors influencing gender preference, model 2 
examines not only those issues addressed by model 1, but also the impact of the 
population policies and the existence of the means to control the sex composition 
of children. While model 1 focuses on determinants of the desired sex of the next 
. child, model 2 explores the impacts of various factors in affecting the actual sex 
composition of children in a family. Therefore, the dependent variable is no 
longer the desire for the sex of children, but the actual gender composition of 
children in a family. 
The second phase of the Chinese Mainland In-depth Fertility Survey provides us 
with the actual number of sons and daughters of each respondent for the 
construction of the dependent variable of the model. With this information we 
can construct three indicators for gender bias, cp (s, d). The first is ratio of sons 
to daughters or the inverse (s / d or d / s). The second is the ratio of sons to all 
children, or the ratio of daughters to all children (s / (s + d) or d / (s + d)). And 
the third is the difference between the number of sons and the number of 
daughters (s - d). 
The first and second indicators are ratios and they have their own shortcomings. 
The first indicator, s / d or d / s, has the problem of being undefined when the 
denominator is zero, e.g., the case of having no children or only having sons or 
daughters. If we delete all those cases, we will lose a lot of information. For the 
second indicator, the ratio of sons to all children or the ratio of daughters to all 
children (s / (s + d) or d / (s + d)), we may also lose useful information. For 
example, there are two families, one with four sons only and one with one son 
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only. The indicator, s / (s + d), for the two cases takes the value of "one". 
However, do these cases really mean there is no difference for our purposes? It 
seems the former family has a stronger son preference than the latter one. Such 
an indicator may be misleading. The third indicator, (s - d), does not have the 
above problems. We therefore use the difference between the number of sons and 
.. the number of daughters as the dependent variables in model 2. 
In a situation where the gender preference does not exist, nothing other than 
biological factors would influence the sex composition of children in a family. 
Thus the regression coefficients of all independent variables will be insignificant. 
Yet, as is probably the case in the Chinese Mainland, some socioeconomic 
variables as well as population policy may exert influence on the gender 
composition of children in a family. Recall equation (3), 
(3) cp(s, d) = f (E,SC, PP) 
With the difference in the number of sons and daughters as the dependent 
variable, we postulate a linear OLS regression model and the equation to be 
estimated is, 
(6) (s - d) = Po + P,Em + P2Ef + P3SCm + p4SCf + p5Ch + p^PP + 1^ 
where E^, Ef, SC,^, SC” Ch, PP are vectors and p.( i = 1’ 2...6) are their 
corresponding vectors of coefficients. 
The independent variables in this model and their expected signs are listed in 
table 22. Since some of the independent variables are the same as those in model 
1 and the reasons for including them were discussed (section IV.1.2.1), here we 
only discuss those variables that are not included in model 1 unless there are 
additional remarks with respect to those variables appearing. 
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IV.I.2.2a/Variahles in the Vector PP 
There are several independent variables related to the one-child policy. The first 
is the dummy variable for families having their first child after 1979. The 
Chinese government adopted the one-child policy in 1978, and it was formally 
.. announced in January 1979. Generally speaking, households could no longer 
satisfy their boy preference by increasing the number of children. Instead, they 
need to satisfy their boy preference within one or two births. In such 
circumstances, if boy preference really exists and people have the means to 
influence the sex of births or the death of their children, the difference in the 
number of sons and of daughters should be influenced by the one-child policy. 
Theoretically, as boy preference exists, the difference should become larger. So 
we include this dummy variable to capture this effect and expect that it is 
positively related to the difference in the numbers of sons and daughters. 
The second is the dummy variable based on the question "local representatives 
talked to you about how many children you should have" in the questionnaire of 
the survey.33 This variable relates to the monitoring of household's fertility 
behaviors by local governments and the strength of implementation of the one-
child policy. Its impact on the dependent variable is, however, not clear. On the 
one hand, if the policy is implemented strictly and allows households to have 
only one child, people with a strong son preference will try their best to have a 
son. On the other hand, with strict monitoring over family planning issues, 
including the use of ultrasound B equipment for prenatal sex determination, it is 
“ F o r this independent variable, 0 means no local representatives had talked to the respondents 
about how many children she should have, and 1 means local representatives had talked to the 
respondents about that. 
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much more difficult for households to control the sex of their children. Under the 
quota of one child (or two if the first child is a daughter in some rural areas), 
households may end up with only daughters as a result. As the survey did not ask 
respondents in greater detail about the implementation of family planning policy, 
it is hard for us to theoretically determine the sign of the variable as there are 
, counteracting forces. 
IV1.2.2b/ Variables in the Vector E 
In this model, the variables for the education level of respondents and their 
husbands may serve as proxies for the estimated contribution of sons and 
daughters to households, as in model 1. It is, however, can conceivable that the 
variables for education in this model are associated not only with the pure 
education effect (see section IV.1.2.1a) but also with the accessibility of the 
means for controlling the sex of birth. This is because being better educated may 
have more knowledge about the means, e.g. ultrasound B equipment and abortion. 
Therefore, we have to be careful about interpreting the coefficient of education 
level. 
In order to find out whether implementation of the one-child policy changes the 
influence of respondents' and their husbands' education level on gender 
preference, we include two interactive variables. They are (1) the product of the 
dummy variable for the one-child policy (family having their first child after 
1979) and the respondent's education level and (2) the product of the dummy 
variable for the one-child policy and the husband's education level. With the 
implementation of the one-child policy, the number of children of a household is 
legally restricted, households need to be more calculating about the sex of their 
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children if they have gender preference and want to realize it. Besides, the 
relation between education level and rewards from work should be stronger as a 
result of the economic reforms and the introduction of the market mechanism 
since 1979. Therefore, the influence of their education level, as an estimated 
income contribution of a son and a daughter to households, may become larger. 
, In other words, we expect the interactive variable corresponding to the wife's 
education level to be negatively related to the dependent variable, while the 
interactive variable with respect to the husband's education level is positively 
related to the dependent variable. 
The variables for household annual income and other proxy variables, i.e. 
durable goods, are included to capture the income effect. There are counteractive 
forces pertaining to the income effect. First, rich people may be able to pay the 
penalty for having more children. Therefore they could satisfy their desire to 
have a son by having more children until there is a son. The number of female 
children may also increase. Second, an increase in income may also render sex-
control methods such as the ultrasound B equipment more accessible. A richer 
family may utilize some sex-control methods to satisfy its son preference without 
violating the one-child policy. Third, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) show that 
higher income levels increase the survival rate of daughters at their early age in 
India. If this holds in the Chinese Mainland, higher household income may 
increase the number of daughters in a family. However, as the health and medical 
system at the local level in the Chinese Mainland is quite sound that the infant 
mortality rate is kept in a quite low level, the effect in the study of Rosenzweig 
and Schultz (1982) may perhaps be insignificant in our estimation. To sum up, 
the direction of the income effect in this model can only be empirically 
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determined. 
IVL2.2c/ Variables in the Vector Ch 
There are some other variables in this model not included in model 1. The 
number of children is one of these independent variables. As stated above, people 
, may increase the number of children to satisfy their desire to have at least one 
son although this violates the one-child policy. With a larger number of children, 
there is more room for the birth and survival of daughters. We expect this 
variable be negatively related to the dependent variable. ^^  
IV1.2.2d/ Variables in the Vector SC 
We include variables indicating the age of both men and women when they had 
their first child and their last child. The aim of including demographic variables 
is to look at the relationship between age and the gender preference. The age at 
the first child may reflect the impact of socioeconomic status of a person. 
Traditionally, Chinese get married when they are very young and have children 
very soon for the purpose of family propagation. As career prospects get brighter, 
people may get married and have their first child relatively later. As a woman 
gains brighter career prospects, and hence higher social status and earnings, she 
may regard females as having the same ability and value as males, thereby 
reducing the boy preference. By the same token, we include the age of man when 
they have their first child and their last child. We expect men who have their first 
child at an older age will have a greater boy preference. 
34 Park and Cho (1995) state that their findings seem to suggest that when the family size is small, 
households have greater concerns over the sex of their children and will do more in controlling 
the sex to satisfy their desire of the sex combination ofchildren. 
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A dummy variable indicating whether the household is living with their parents 
is also included. The older generation should have a stronger boy preference. If a 
household lives with them, their son preference should have larger impact on the 
household's decision on the gender composition of children? They may ask the 
household to have at least one son to continue the ancestral line. Therefore we 
. expect this variable to be positively related to the dependent variable. 
Finally, dummy variables for the place of residence of both respondents and their 
husbands during their childhood are included/^ Easterlin (1969) states that one's 
taste is developed throughout his life, including the childhood period. If this is 
true, it should be true for one's gender preference too. In order to capture such 
information, we include these variables in our model. As the son preference is 
stronger in rural areas, we expect people living in rural areas in their childhood to 
have a stronger preference for sons. 
Since some of the variables we use are just proxies, we may have the problem of 
measurement errors. Taking education level as an example, we use it to be a 
proxy for the contribution of a son and a daughter to the income of the household. 
However, as it is a proxy, it may suffer from measurement error. 
Econometricians prove that when committing measurement error, the least-
squares estimates of the regression parameters will be biased and inconsistent. 
The degree of bias and inconsistency relates to the variance of the measurement 
error. One technique to solve the problem is instrumental-variables estimation, 
that involves the search for a new variable that is highly correlated with the 
35 Han and Li (1999) find that the female child mortality rate is higher for those girls living in 
extended families. 
-站 Zhang(1990) also uses this kind of variables in estimating the fertility in China. 
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independent variable and at the same time not correlated with the error term in 
the equation. However, due to the limited choice of variables in the database, we 
cannot use the instrumental-variables estimation. Using parents' education level 
as a proxy for the contribution of a son and a daughter is the best way we have so 
far. 
4 * 
In this model, we only include observations with respect to those respondents 
who have stated that they did not want a next child, had not remarried and had at 
least one child. The reasons for using such a truncated sample are as follows. 
First, if a household wants to have an additional chilcP’ its present children's 
gender composition may not reflect its gender preference. If we include this type 
of households in our estimation, the result may not be reliable. Second, if a 
respondent had remarried, she may have brought children with her to join the 
new family and we are not sure of the impact of such children on the household's 
desired sex composition of children. For example, a man may still want his own 
son even if he married a woman with a boy, so that this household may end up 
with two sons. If we take the difference in the number of sons and daughters as 
an indicator for gender preference, this type of households seems to have a 
stronger son preference than households with only one son. However, such a man 
may want only one son if marrying a woman with no child. Therefore, 
remarriage may create problems with the indicator for gender preference.^^ Third, 
not wanting any children does not necessarily mean no gender bias. A household 
may prefer a boy rather than a girl while it actually wants no children. However 
the indicator of gender preference, i.e., the difference in the number of sons and 
37 There is a question that did respondents honestly answer the question of whether they like a 
next child. Under the population policy, there are penalties on people violating the one-child 
policy. Some respondents mayjust answer no to avoid any troubles. 
38 We have also done estimation with the observations with remarriage. The results are listed in 
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daughters, takes the same value in the case of no child and having the same 
number of sons and daughters. While the latter implies no gender preference, the 





This thesis uses data from Gansu province collected in the second phase of the 
Chinese Mainland In-depth Fertility Survey, conducted in February 1988 by the 
State Statistical Bureau of PRC with the assistance of the International Statistical 
Institute Research Center. The survey includes the following provinces: Liaoning, 
, Shandong, Guangdong, Guizhou, Gansu and Beijing. We choose Gansu province 
for our empirical analysis as its son preference in term of the sex ratio at birth 
and the level of its economic development is lower. (See table 9 for the sex ratio 
at birth in different provinces) If economic factors really influence gender 
preference in Gansu, they should also be influential in gender preference in other 
provinces where are with a stronger son preference and higher levels of 
economic development, where the impacts of economic factors may be stronger. 
There are 5751 observations in the database from Gansu province. In model 1，as 
we only include respondents want a next child and exclude those observations 
with missing values for some independent variables, the sample size then reduces 
to 1670. In model 2，we only include respondents indicating that they do not 
want any more children, had not remarried and have at least one child. The 
sample size reduces to 3417. The sample statistics for these three samples' sizes 
are listed in table 23, 24 and 25 respectively. 
For the variables of the respondents' husbands' age when the first and the last 
children were born, there seems to be some errors in the database. We find out 
that，after calculation, two husbands have their first child before they themselves 
were bom; 9 husbands had their first child before age 15; and one man had his 
first child when he was aged 2. As we already excluded observations who had 
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remarried, this is not the result of children being brought in by remarried women. 
This is an error in collecting data. To avoid the impacts of these errors on our 
estimation, we have excluded those 11 observations.-^ 
«• 
•'' We have run the estimation without the variables for the men's age when their first and last 
children were born and so including those 11 observations. The results are shown in Appendix 3. 
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Table 21 List of Variables in Model 1 
Types of Variables Expected sign Expected sign 
Variables (Y=1) (Y=2) 
Ch Difference in the number of Negative Positive 
sons and daughters 
Ch Household without children* Positive Negative 
E & SC Respondent's education level Negative Positive 
E & SC Respondent's husband's - _ 
education level 
E Respondent works in the Negative Positive 
non-agricultural sector 
E Respondent's husband works Positive Negative 
in the non-agricultural sector 
E Household annual income Negative Positive 
E Washing machine* Negative Positive 
E Sewing machine* Negative Positive 
E Refrigerator* Negative Positive 
E Television* Negative Positive 
SC Respondent's age Positive Negative 
SC Respondent's age**2 - _ 
SC Respondent's husband's age Positive Negative 
SC Respondent's husband's - _ 
age**2 
SC & PP Respondent's nationality is Positive Negative 
Han* 
SC & PP Respondent's husband's Positive Negative 
nationality is Han* 
SC & PP Living in cities* Negative Positive 
SC & PP Living in towns* Negative Positive 
Key: Ch: Variables indicate the sex composition ofchildren; E: Economic variables; SC: 
Social and Cultural variables; PP: Population policy variable; 
* Dummy variables 
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Table 22 List of Variables in Model 2 
Types of Variables Expected sign 
variables 
^ Having the first child after 1979* Positive 
PP Local representatives talked to you about how -
many children you should have* 
CH Number of children Negative 
E & SC Respondent's education level Negative 
E & S C Respondent's husband's education level Positive 
E Household annual income -
E Washing machine* _ 
E Sewing machine* -
E Refrigerator* _ 
E Television* _ 
SC Respondent's age when the first child was born Negative 
SC Respondent's age when the last child was born -
SC Respondent's husband's age when the first Positive 
child was born 
SC Respondent's husband's age when the last child -
was born 
SC Respondent lived in city in her childhood* Negative 
SC Respondent lived in town in her childhood* Negative 
SC Respondent's husband lived in city in his Negative 
childhood* 
SC Respondent's husband lived in town in his Negative 
childhood* 
SC Household living with elderly parents* Positive 
SC & PP Respondent's nationality is Han* Positive 
SC & PP Respondent's husband's nationality is Han* Positive 
SC & PP Living in cities* _ 
SC & PP Living in towns* _ 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 22 - continued 
Types of Variables Expected sign 
variables # 
Interactive Education level of respondent who had her Negative 
variable (SC & first child after 1979 
E ) * P P 
Interactive Education level of respondent's husband's who Positive 
, variable (SC & had his first child after 1979 
E ) * P P 
Key: PP: Population pol icy variable; Ch: Variables indicate the sex composi t ion of 
children; SC: Social and Cultural variables; E: Economic variables 
* D u m m y variables 
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Table 23.a Sample Statistics of the Database of Gansu 
Variables Mean Standard Range 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of child 2.51465 1.59394 0 W 
Difference in the number 0.11570 1.53992 -6 6 
of sons and daughters 
Respondent's age 32.52122 8.50864 15 49 
.* 
Respondent's husband's 36.36364 9.39380 15 85 
age 
Respondent's education 2.91172 4.07124 0 16 
level 
Respondent's husband's 6.03249 4.25178 0 16 
education level 
Household annual 1325.65984 1373.15898 11 24000 
income 
Sample size: 5324'° 
:>7$9nce there are missing values for some observations, the sample size is reduced from 5751 to 
100 
Table 23.b Sample Statistics of the database of Gansu 
(Frequency) 
Variable “ F r e q u e n c y ~ 
Having the first child after 1979 or no child yet “ 2176 
Respondents have remarriage 198 
Household without children 525 
, Local representatives talked to you about how many children 2147 
you should have 
Respondent works in the non-agricultural sector 608 
Respondent's husband works in the non-agricultural sector 1423 
Washing machine 597 
Sewing machine 2207 
Refrigerator 45 
Television 13Q3 
Household living with elderly parents 4432 
Respondent's nationality is Han 4861 
Respondent's husband's nationality is Han 4878 
Living in cities 497 
Living in towns 217 
Sample size: 5324 
1 0 1 
Table 24.a Sample Statistics of the Sample for Model 1 
Variables Mean Standard Range 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
The desired sex of next child 0.98263 0.62526 0 2 
Difference in the number of -0.17246 1.11484 -6 3 
sons and daughters 
Household without children* 0.30120 0.45892 0 1 
•‘ Respondent's education level 4.01856 4.39241 0 16 
Respondent's husband's 7.09820 4.01405 0 16 
education level 
Respondent works in the 0.11257 0.31617 0 1 
non-agricultural sector 
Respondent's husband works 0.26048 0.43903 0 1 
in the non-agricultural sector 
Household annual income 1271.95569 1362.97186 25 24000 
Washing machine* 0.095808 0.29442 0 1 
Sewing machine* 0.34611 0.47587 0 1 
Refrigerator* 0.0047904 0.069068 0 1 
Television* 0.20539 0.40411 0 1 
Respondent's age 24.74910 5.68010 15 49 
Respondent's age**2 644.76228 330.64023 225 2401 
Respondent's husband's age 28.17485 6.57842 15 85 
Respondent's husband's 837.07186 444.27227 225 7225 
age**2 
Respondent's nationality is 0.87964 0.32548 0 1 
Han* 
Respondent's husband's 0.88204 0.32266 0 1 
nationality is Han* 
Living in cities* 0.085629 0.27990 0 1 
Living in towns* 0.041317 0.19908 0 1 
Sample size: 1670 
* Dummy variables 
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Table 24.b Frequency for Dummy Variables in Model 1 
Variable Frequency 
The desired sex of next child: No preference 341 
Boy 1017 
Girl 312 
Household without children 503 
Respondent works in the non-agricultural sector 188 
•_ Respondent's husband works in the non-agricultural sector 435 
Washing machine 160 
Sewing machine 578 
Refrigerator 8 
Television 343 
Respondent's nationality is Han 1469 
Respondent's husband's nationality is Han 1473 
Living in cities 143 
Living in towns 69 
Sample size: 1670 
1 0 3 
Table 25.a Sample Statistics of the Sample for Model 2 
Variables Mean Standard Range 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Difference in the number of~~0.24583 1.68628 ^ 6 
sons and daughters 
Having the first child after 0.18584 0.38903 0 1 
1979* 
•• Local representatives talked 0.36670 0.48197 0 1 
to you about how many 
children you should have* 
Number ofchildren 3.20983 1.31628 1 10 
Respondent's education 2.41264 3.82278 0 16 
level 
Respondent's husband's 5.61399 4.24105 0 16 
education level 
Household annual income 1353.41557 1388.54246 11 24000 
Washing machine* 0.12262 0.32805 0 1 
Sewing machine* 0.44454 0.49699 0 1 
Refrigerator* 0.010828 0.10351 0 1 
Television* 0.26719 0.44256 0 1 
Respondent's age when the 20.49839 2.68574 14 39 
first child was bom 
Respondent's age when the 27.76695 4.35927 16 45 
last child was bom 
Respondent's husband's age 24.33714 3.99786 16 77 
when the first child was 
born 
Respondent's husband's age 31.85533 5.34416 18 82 
when the last child was 
born 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 25.a - continued 
Variables Mean Standard Range 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Respondent lived in city in 0.058531 0.23478 0 1 
her childhood* 
Respondent lived in town in 0.021071 0.14364 0 1 
her childhood* 
Respondent's husband lived 0.072871 0.25996 0 1 
in city in his childhood* 
Respondent's husband lived 0.027802 0.16443 0 1 
in town in his childhood* 
Household living with 0.81621 0.38737 0 1 
elderly parents* 
Respondent's nationality is 0.93503 0.24651 0 1 
Han* 
Respondent's husband's 0.93854 0.24020 0 1 
nationality is Han* 
Living in cities* 0.098332 0.29781 0 1 
Living in towns* 0.038338 0.19204 0 1 
Education level of 0.78578 2.62326 0 16 
respondent who had her 
first child after 1979 
Education level of 1.47820 3.51405 0 16 
respondent's husband's who 
had his first child after 1979 
* Dummy variables 
Sample size: 3417 
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Table 25.b Frequency for Dummy Variables in Model 2 
Variable Frequency 
Having the first child after 1979 ^ 
Local representatives talked to you about how many 1253 
children you should have 
Respondent lived in city in her childhood 200 
Respondent lived in town in her childhood 72 
•‘ Respondent's husband lived in city in his childhood 249 
Respondent's husband lived in town in his childhood 95 
Washing machine 419 
Sewing machine 1519 
Refrigerator 37 
Television 913 
Household living with elderly parents 2789 
Respondent's nationality is Han 3195 
Respondent's husband's nationality is Han 3207 
Living in cities 336 
Living in towns 131 
Sample size: 3417 
1 0 6 
Chapter V 
Estimated Results 
There are four sections in this chapter. In the first section, we use the two 
indicators for gender preference to see whether gender bias exists in our sample. 
Then we discuss the estimated results of the two models in the following two 
sections. Finally, there is a conclusion for this chapter. 
V.1/ Proxies for Gender Preference 
Before going into the two gender preference indicators, we look at the overall 
number of sons and daughters of our data set. The whole population of our 
database consists of 5751 observations with 14443 children. Among them, 7544 
are boys and 6899 are girls. The sons to daughters ratio is 109.3. This is a quite 
high value because if there was no gender preference, it should be very close to 
100. 
If there was no gender preference, we do not expect there to be a very large 
difference in the desired sex of next child, although it could be affected by the 
gender composition of existing children. For the sample in model 1, there are a 
total of 1670 observations. 341 respondents reported that they have no sex 
preference. 1017 prefer boys while 312 prefer girls. This means that 61 per cent 
of respondents prefer boys while only 20 per cent of them prefer girls. (Diagram 
3) The number for boys is threefold that for girls. This shows a strong son 
preference. 
In model 2, we use the difference in the number of sons and daughters as an 
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indicator for gender preference. If there is no gender preference, the indicator for 
average should take the value of zero. If this indicator take a positive value, there 
is son preference and vice versa. The average difference in the number of sons 
and daughters in the sample for model 2 is 0.24583. This indicator also supports 
the existence of son preference. To sum up, all the indicators seem to suggest that 
there is a son preference in our sample. 
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V.2/ Estimated Results of Model 1 
The estimated results of model 1 are listed in table 26 and table 27. Before 
looking at the marginal impact of each independent variable on the desired sex of 
the next child, we first look at the overall reliability of the model. The likelihood 
ratio of the estimated model is listed at the bottom of the table 26. The likelihood 
ratio (LR) takes the following form: 
LR = -2(ln L r - I n L) 
where "Lr" and "L" are the log-likelihood functions evaluated on the restricted 
and unrestricted model respectively. The unrestricted model is the model with the 
probability equation as equation (4'). 
Prob(Y,=j) = F(p'X) where X = (E, SC, Ch) 
The restricted model is the model that assumes the coefficients of all independent 
variables are equal to zero. The LR test is just like an F test in that all of the 
slopes of a regression are zero. The LR of model 1 is 1317.456 and this is 
significant at the one percent level. Therefore, the hull hypothesis that all of the 
slope coefficients are zero is rejected. In other words, the gender preference is 
not a random phenomenon, but is influenced by various factors. We will discuss 
those in detail. 
Concerning the goodness of fit of our model, there is no R-square statistics for 
the logit model. The likelihood ratio index (LRI), defined as 1 - ln L / ln Lr, 
seems to be an alternative for the goodness of fit test. Its value lies within the 
range of zero and one. A value of zero means all slope coefficients are zero while 
a value of one means the model is a prefect fit. However, a value of one in fact 
implies that at least one of the independent variables, after some transformation, 
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is identical to the dependent variable, otherwise, it is impossible to make the LRI 
equals to one. In this case, it is a flaw in a model and a fatal error is committed. 
On the other hand, any value between zero and 1 has no natural interpretation. 
Therefore, the likelihood ratio index is not very u s e f u l . The LRI for model 1 is 
0.419692. Since this is between zero and one, it has no natural meaning. 
.> 
In order to find out how good our model is and choose the best one from 
different specifications, the "hit-and-miss" table is used. A "hit-and-miss" table 
records the actual choice of each observation and compares it with the one 
predicted in the estimated model. With the estimated coefficients, the 
probabilities of each alternative for each observation can be calculated. In our 
model, these alternatives are "no sex preference", "boy" and "girl" for next birth. 
The alternative with the greater probability is regarded as the predicted choice in 
the estimated model. Table 27 is the "hit-and-miss" table for model 1. For 
example, among the 1138 cases predicted to prefer a boy as their next child, 928 
actually preferred a son. The correct prediction rate for boy is 81.55 per cent. 
Among that 1138 cases, 196 and 14 cases actually chose "no sex preference" and 
"girl", but our model predicts them as preferring "boy". The failure rate for boy 
is then 18.45 per cent. The correct prediction rates, stated in the last column of 
the table 27, for the three alternatives are 48.72, 81.55 per cent and 63.00 per 
cent respectively. Therefore, our model is good at predicting the preference for 
boy and poor for "no sex preference". The overall correct prediction rate is 74.97 
per cent.42 
41 See Greene(1990). 
42 The LRs and "hit-and-miss" tables for other specifications of model 1 are listed in Appendix 
3.1. 
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Table 26 reports the estimated marginal effects of each independent variable and 
their t-statistics. As stated in the methodology chapter for model 1, in the 
multinomial logit model, the marginal effect is not g, but is F'(^lX)_^. In table 26， 
the column "dProb(Y=l)/dX" is the marginal effect of each independent variable 
on the probability of preferring a son as the next child; "dProb(Y=2)/dX" is the 
marginal effect of each independent variable on the probability of preferring a 
daughter as the next child. The reference group is the probability of having no 
sex preference with respect to next child. 
VJ.2a/Economic Factors (E) 
The estimated results of the education levels of women are not entirely in 
accordance with our expectations. As stated already, there may be two effects 
captured by the variable: one effect pertains to the expected contribution of a 
daughter; the other is the pure education effect. Both effects should reduce son 
preference. However, according to our estimation, education levels of women 
and whether women work in the non-agricultural sector has no impact on gender 
preference. Such a finding possibly implies that women's earning ability seems 
to have no impact on the gender preference indicated by the desired sex of the 
next child. While we assumed that a household is a rational decision-making unit 
in which a woman's eaming ability may play a similar role to that of husband 
with respect to the desired sex of the next child, it is perhaps not inconceivable 
that a family can also be regarded as a unit in which the distribution of power 
among household members is uneven. (See Sen 1989) Women may then have 
little say in decision making. 
Men's education and their occupation have impacts on gender preference. The 
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higher the education level of man, the greater is the probability of the household 
preferring a daughter as the next child. Men working in the non-agricultural 
sector increase households' probability of preferring a boy as their next birth. As 
stated before, education may capture both the effects of the expected contribution 
of a son as well as the pure education effect. While occupation could only reflect 
the effect of the expected contribution of a son, the empirical results may mean 
•». 
two things. First, the higher the expected contribution of a son, the higher is 
husbands' son preference. Second, regarding the impact of man's education, the 
pure education effect outweighs the effect of the higher expected contribution of 
a son to the household. 
The income effect, which is reflected by the sign of the variables of annual 
income and durable goods in this model, is quite clear. The higher the income 
level, the lower is the probability of preferring a son as the next child and the 
higher is the probability of preferring a daughter. Perhaps it is because 
households with higher income are willing to pay the penalty for having more 
children, giving more room to the births of daughters as households need not to 
satisfy their son preference in only one or two births. 
V.1.2b/Sex Composition of Children (Ch) 
The sign of the coefficient of the difference in the number of sons and daughters 
fits with our expectation: if the number of daughters is larger than that of sons, it 
is more likely that that household prefers a son as the next child and vice versa. 
The above empirical finding seems to suggest that most Chinese consider 
optimal to have both sons and daughters. 
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Given the prevailing son preference, we expect that if a household does not have 
children yet, a son is preferred as the first child. However, the estimates suggest 
that households without children tend to have no sex preference for their next 
child. This is shown by the negative sign of the coefficient of "households 
without children" on both probabilities for hoping next birth being a son and 
being a daughter. 
.* 
V.1.2c/Social and Cultural Factors (SC) 
We expected that younger people have less son preference as they are less 
influenced by the traditional social norm of son preference. However, according 
to the estimation, the older the wife, the higher is the probability the household 
desires a daughter as its next birth^\ The younger the husband, the more likely 
that he has no sex preference.^^ Although younger men are less likely to prefer a 
girl as the next child, this is still in line with the expectation that the young have 
less son preference. The question, then, is what causes young women to be less 
likely to prefer a girl as the next child. Our estimation does not provide an 
answer. However, one possible reason is that, in the Chinese Mainland, younger 
women are more likely to be influenced by family planning policy through 
campaigns, education and administration channels. For example, women aged 
below 20 when the survey was conducted should have learned family planning 
policy during their schooltime; family planning workers are also more likely to 
put more effort on women aged around 20 to 30 as those women are more likely 
to get married and give birth. As stated already, the family planning policy, 
43 The probability is increasing in a decreasing rale. The estimated marginal effect of the square 
of the wife's age is - 0.0003. 
拟 The probability is decreasing in a decreasing rate. The estimated marginal effects of the 
square of the husband's age on both probabilities for desiring a son and a daughter are negative in 
sign. 
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especially the one-child policy, strengthens the son preference in people. 
The place of residence is significant in our estimation. First, compared to those 
living in rural areas, people living in cities are more likely to prefer a daughter as 
the next child. Second, compared to those living in rural areas, living in towns 
decreases both probabilities for preferring a son and a daughter, and increases the 
.^  
probability of having no gender preference. These results seem to suggest that, 
comparing with people living in cities, the effect of the strong traditional boy 
preference outweighs the impact of relatively lax enforcement of the one-child 
policy in rural areas. 
Next, if the wife is Han in nationality, the household is more likely to desire a 
boy as the next birth. However, if the husband is Han in nationality, the 
probability of desiring a son as the next child falls. The magnitude of the wife's 
coefficient is larger than that of the husband. Therefore, comparing with a family 
with non-Han couple, a Han household has a higher probability of desiring a son 
as the next child. 
In this model, we estimated the impacts of various factors on the desired sex of 
the next child and we find out that gender preference is influenced by various 
factors. Regarding the contribution of children to households, while the expected 
daughter's contribution may not influence the gender preference, the expected 
son's contribution does. Our estimation suggests that the higher the expected 
son's contribution, the stronger is the son preference. When the income of a 
household increases, it is able and more willing to pay the penalty for having 
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more children, it is less keen to desire its next child as a boy. Therefore its son 
preference is weaker. 
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V.3/ Estimated Results of Model 2 
As in the previous section, we discuss the empirical findings from model 2 and 
go through the effects of the independent variables on the sex composition of 
households. The estimated results are listed in table 28. 
V.1.3a/Economic Factors (E) 
,' 
In model 2, the education level of wives is insignificant while the variable 
capturing the interaction between the wife's education and having the first child 
after 1979 is negatively significant, i.e., the higher the education level of women 
having the first child after 1979，the lower is household's son preference. 
According to the estimated results, one further year of education for women 
having their first child after 1979 reduces the difference in the number of sons 
and daughters by 0.038. The average number of year of wives' education in our 
sample is about two and a half, and the average difference in the number of sons 
and daughters is 0.246. Then, the son preference implied by the difference could 
be eliminated if the average number of year of wives' education could be raised 
to about nine years. 
There are two possible reasons why the education of wives is only significant 
with respect to those households having their first child after 1979. First, those 
households having their first child after 1979 are more influenced by the one-
child policy as all of their children were born under the policy. They may be 
more calculating in the decision of having how many children and the gender 
composition of children, as there are rewards and penalties of the population 
policies. Therefore, the expected contribution of children becomes more 
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important. As the expected contribution of a daughter increases (implied by a 
higher education level of wives), households' son preference becomes weaker 
and the difference in the number of sons and daughters becomes smaller. Second, 
the economic rewards of education have become greater as the economic reform 
in the Chinese Mainland started in 1978. Before the economic reform, jobs and 
wages were allocated and determined by the government as there was no free 
market. One's reward for work was not in accordance with to one's productivity 
in a planned economy. The effect of getting more education, and so being more 
productive, might play no role in the decision about the gender composition of 
children. Therefore, the economic effect of education of women is only effective 
in the households having their first children after 1979，as all their children were 
born under the one-child policy and economic reform. On the other hand, the 
pure education effect seems to be ineffective, as the education level of wives is 
insignificant.45 
Next, the education level of men is significant no matter whether they have their 
first child before or after 1979. However, the impacts are different. The sign of 
the coefficient of the education of men is negative^s, i.e., reducing the son 
preference, and the sign of coefficient of the education of men having their first 
child after 1979 is positive, i.e., increasing the son preference. Why do they have 
opposite effects? As stated in the methodology chapter, education for men may 
have counteracting effects: (1) the pure education effect, i.e., the positive 
influence of education on one's perception of gender equality; (2) the effect of a 
higher expected contribution of a son to households. Similar to the argument for 
45 The proposed last effect of education, i.e., an increase the accessibility of means controlling the 
sex ofchildren, helps the households realize their gender preference about the sex ofchildren. 
46 This result is similar to the result in model 1. 
1 1 7 
female's education above, the variable for men's education for those having the 
first child after 1979 captures the effect of economic reform and the one-child 
policy that take place after 1978 and 1979. The variable of men's education 
captures the pure education effect. Then, one possible explanation is that, the 
economic effect of education is not effective until the economic reform launched 
in 1978. The total effect of education is the sum of "men's education" and 
"men's education of those having their first child after 1979". The coefficient of 
"men's education" is -0.021 and the coefficient of "men's education of those 
having their first child after 1979" is 0.044. Therefore, the total effect of men's 
education on the gender preference implied by the difference in the number of 
sons and daughters is 0.023. One more year of men's education will increase the 
difference by 0.023. 
The income effect is not clear according to our estimations. Two variables for the 
income effect are significant, namely "annual income" and "refrigerator". While 
higher annual income increases the son preference, the ownership of a 
refrigerator reduces it. As mentioned already the income effect is mixed. 
Therefore, we cannot make any conclusion for the income effect on the 
difference in the number of sons and daughters. 
V.L3b/Population Policies (PP) 
Other than the two interactive variables just discussed, there are two variables 
about the one-child policy. One is "having the first child after 1979" which 
captures the effect of the implementation of the one-child policy. Although this 
variable is insignificant, the interactive variables with the education level of both 
women and men are significant as discussed above. This suggests that the one-
1 1 8 
child policy influences the difference in the number of sons and daughters 
indirectly through education. 
The variable for the monitoring of households' fertility behaviors by local 
governments is negatively significant, i.e., it narrows the difference in the 
number of sons and daughters. As stated in the methodology section {IVL2.2a), 
this variable may influence the gender composition of children through strict 
quota of children and through strict monitoring over various techniques for 
family planning, e.g., the use of ultrasound B equipment for prenatal sex 
determination. The former strengthens households' son preference, as households 
have to satisfy their son preference within one or two births. The latter reduces 
the household's manipulation of the sex composition with respect to its children. 
With the prevailing son preference, a stricter control of the techniques should 
reduce the difference in the number of sons and daughters. Therefore, the 
negative sign of the variable may imply that the latter effect outweighs the 
former. 
V.1.3c/Sex Composition of Children (Ch) 
The coefficient of the number of children is significant. As expected, the sign is 
negative. This supports the argument that people may increase the number of 
children to satisfy their desire to have at least one or more son, and that there are 
more room for the birth and survival of daughters in a family with a larger 
number of children. This points out the dilemma between population control by 
birth quota, i.e. one-child policy, and the balance of males to females. The more 
restrictive the limitation on the number of children in a family is’ the more 
imbalanced is the male to female ratio. According to the estimated results, 
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theoretically, having one more child could reduce the difference in the number of 
sons and daughters by 0.21. As the average number of children in our sample is 
3.2, this means that allowing households to have about 4 children may eliminate 
the son preference in terms of the number of sons and daughters. 
V.1.3d/ Social and Cultural Factors (SC) 
The sign of the coefficient of the variable for households living with their elderly 
parents is negative. This means that households living with parents will result in 
a lower boy preference. This result is not in line with the findings of Han and Li 
(1999). Their results suggest the son preference in families with elderly parents is 
stronger, as the female child mortality is higher in those extended families. It 
seems that the effect of living in extended families on gender bias has to be 
further studied. 
Our estimated results show that "living in cities" is insignificant while "living in 
towns" is negatively significant, implying the son preference of people living in 
towns are weaker than those living in rural areas. There are conflicting effects of 
the variables for the place of residence as stated before. On the one hand, the 
enforcement of the one-child policy is lax in rural areas. On the other hand, there 
is a stronger boy preference in rural areas. The result of "living in towns" may be 
because the influence of stronger boy preference outweighs the influence of 
relatively lax enforcement of the one-child policy in rural areas comparing to 
those living in towns. 
Unlike the result of Han and Li (1999), the nationality of a household has no 
impact on gender preference. The insignificance of nationality of the parents 
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indicates that the more lenient population policy towards ethnic minorities by 
government may not have significant impact on gender preference. 
Besides, the living place of wives and husbands in their childhood and their ages 
when the first and last child were born are also insignificant. The insignificance 
of the living place in wives' and husbands' childhood implies that the theory of 
Easterlin (1969) about one's taste being developed throughout his life including 
his childhood period may not be valid concerning gender preference in our 
sample. The insignificance of the age of wives and husbands when the first and 
last child were born suggests that it has no impact on the difference in the 
number of sons and daughters. 
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V.4/ Conclusion for the Estimated Results 
Researchers have done a lot of work about gender preference in the Chinese 
Mainland. Some of them simply compile summary statistics to find out the 
existence of son preference. Others provide evidence of the existence of son 
preference and identify the underlying factors when they analyze issues such as 
fertility and the conditions for signing one-child certificates. Some studies 
analyze the costs and benefits of having children. All these studies furnish a lot 
of valuable information on gender preference in the Chinese Mainland. Findings 
on gender bias are, however, just by-products of these studies. Very few 
econometric studies actually analyze the determinants of gender preference in the 
Chinese Mainland using proxies of gender bias as the left-hand-side variable. 
Our study therefore complements previous studies and suggests directions for 
further studies. 
This thesis uses the data from Gansu province collected in the second phase of 
the Chinese Mainland In-depth Fertility Survey conducted in 1988 to analyze the 
gender preference in the Chinese Mainland. By using different proxies for gender 
preference, our empirical findings suggest that households do have a son 
preference in support of many previous studies. 
The desired sex of the next child is used as the dependent variable in model 1 
while the difference in the number of sons and daughters is used as the dependent 
variable in model 2. The econometric findings of model 1 and 2 suggest that 
economic, social and cultural factors and population policies have impacts on 
gender preference. Some of the findings of the two models are different, but we 
have to bear in mind that the dependent variables of the two models are not the 
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same, they measure gender preference in different aspects. The findings seem to 
suggest that the expected contribution of children is effective in influencing the 
sex of children. For example, the education of wives is not significant in model 1, 
but its interactive variable with households having their first child after 1979 in 
model 2，which concerning the actual sex combination of children, is significant. 
The income effects in the two models are also different. It may be because that in 
model 2, the income effects include the accessibility of means controlling the sex 
of children while it is not included in model 1. 
The significance of variables in model 2 suggests that households have the means 
to control the gender composition of children. The significance of variables 
related to the one-child policy also indicates that the population policy does 
influence gender preference of households. It also reinforces the effect of the 
expected income contribution of children on gender bias. 
The second model also provides evidence of the dilemma between population 
control and son preference. Estimated results suggest that with more children, the 
preference for sons becomes less intense. Our results are consistent with the 
findings of Park and Cho (1995) on Korea. To ameliorate these adverse effects of 
the one-child policy, measures such as pension system and the provision of 
economic rewards to people following the one-child policy should be given more 
attention. 
As stated before, some of the independent variables in the two models are 
proxies and thus problems pertaining to measurement error may exist. However, 
there are no better alternatives provided in the data set. For example, better 
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proxies for the expected income contribution of children, such as the wages of 
wives and husband, should be very useful in getting a more accurate picture 
about gender bias though our data set does not have this kind of information. Our 
findings are therefore preliminary. There is much room for improvement when 
more data are available. 
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Diagram 3 Desired Sex of the Next Child 
19% 
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Source: Gansu province collected in the second phase of the Chinese Mainland In-Depth 
Fertility Survey conducted in 1988 
Sample size: 1670 
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Table 26 Estimated Results of Model 1 
Variables dProb (Y=l)/dx~~dProb (Y=2)/dx 
Constant 0.79219 -0.26695 
(3.88240) (-0.668860) 
氺氺氺 
Difference in the number of sons and -0.29462 0.21054 
daughters (-13.7647) (7.49845) 
氺氺氺 氺氺氺 
Household without children -0.067849 -0.063209 
(-4.84392) (-2.79246) 
氺氺氺 氺氺氺 
Respondent's education level -0.0007198 0.0020673 
(0.054450) (1.10063) 
Respondent's husband's education level -0.0015354 0.0028141 
(-0.149248) (1.29722) 
氺 
Respondent works in the non-agricultural 0.014348 -0.0020065 
’ sector (0.287367) (0.036712) 
Respondent's husband works in the non- 0.053105 -0.0067055 
agricultural sector (1.99605) (0.269368) 
氺氺 
Household annual income -8.39960D-06 -5.24549D-06 
(-1.72267) (-1.12330) 
氺氺 
Washing machine -0.068540 0.077436 
(-0.785606) (2.05200) 
氺氺 
Sewing machine -0.045989 -0.0019255 
(-2.54690) (-0.882263) 
氺本木 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 26 - continued 
Variables dProb (Y=l)/dx~~dProb (Y=2)/dx 
Refrigerator -0.29754 0.12508 
(-1.47322) (0.690932) 
氺 
Television 0.0085746 0.035287 
(0.866788) (1.87095) 
氺氺 
Respondent's age -0.015704 0.019815 
(-0.501534) (1.41793) 
氺 
Respondent's age**2 0.00017246 -0.0003312 
(0.135733) (-1.49540) 
氺 
Respondent's husband's age -0.025122 -0.013227 
(-2.28588) (-2.00972) 
氺氺 * 氺 
Respondent's husband's age**2 0.00044060 0.00022055 
(2.37648) (2.16450) 
氺 * 氺 氺氺 
Respondent's nationality is Han 0.32307 -0.046474 
(2.07321) (0.257024) 
氺氺 
Respondent's husband's nationality is Han -0.24182 0.038006 
(-1.53174) (-0.156432) 
氺 
Living in cities -0.093908 0.072338 
(-1.12635) (1.49250) 
‘ 氺 
Living in towns -0.035731 -0.054860 
(-1.33852) (-1.82494) 
* 氺氺 
Likelihood ratio 1317.456*** 
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*** 1% significant level 
** 5% significant level 
* 10% significant level 
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Table 27 “Hit and Miss" Table for Model 1 
Actual Totai Correct 
Prediction 
rate 
0 1 2 
0 ^ ^ I2 78 48.72%~~ 
Predicted 1 196 928 14 1138 81.55% 
2 107 61 286 454 63.00% 
Total 341 1017 312 1670 
Percent of overall correct prediction: 74.97% 
Alternative: 0 = no sex preference 
1 = boy 
2 = daughter 
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Table 28 Estimation Results of Model 2 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant ~ 2.55853 7 .46372***^ 
Having the first child after 1979 -0.121798 -0.928237 
Local representatives asked about children -0.109835 -1.86982** 
Number of children -0.207119 -4.50735*** 
Respondent's education level -0.177723E-02 -0.153671 
Respondent's husband's education level -0.020510 -2.27852** 
Household annual income 0.512548E-04 1.98492** 
Washing machine 0.046956 0.377056 
Sewing machine 0.042169 0.651621 
Refrigerator -0.382655 -1.43089* 
Television -0.099838 -1.26292 
Respondent's age when the first child was born 0.018271 0.321437 
Respondent's age when the last child was born -0.050985 -0.901843 
Respondent's husband's age when the first child -0.036684 -0.642825 
was born 
Respondent's husband's age when the last child 0.026015 0.454422 
was born 
Respondent lived in city in her childhood -0.201077 -1.22381 
Respondent lived in town in her childhood 0.198547 0.841352 
Respondent's husband lived in city in his -0.175712 -1.19730 
childhood 
Respondent's husband lived in town in his 0.190281 0.845750 
childhood 
Household living with elderly parents -0.177650 -2.25734** 
Respondent's nationality is Han -0.296958 -0.712237 
Respondent's husband's nationality is Han 0.359600E-02 0.838445E-02 
Living in cities -0.050453 -0.303334 
Living in towns -0.461540 -2.17144** 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 28 - continued 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
Interactive variables 
(Respondent's education level) * (Having the -0.038416 -2.49893*** 
first child after 1979) 
(Respondent's husband's education level) * 0.044195 2.73791*氺氺 
(Having the first child after 1979) 
Mean of dependent variable 0.245830 
Adjusted R-square 0.037853 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 6.37568*** 
*** 1% significant level 
** 5% significant level 
* 10% significant level 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion 
The alarming increase in the sex ratio at birth, often attributed to the population 
policy and prevailing son preference, has been one of the major concerns over 
the population in the Chinese Mainland of many researchers. Analyzing gender 
bias and its underlying causes is an essential task in order to control population 
growth without unwanted and perverse consequences. In this thesis, we aim at 
finding out (1) whether son preference exists; (2) the factors underlying son 
preference and the magnitudes of their impact; (3) the impact of population 
policy. 
We review the history of the population policy in the Chinese Mainland since 
1949 and the literature about gender preference. Population policies had not been 
consistently implemented before the 1970's due to changes in political climate. 
As the huge and rapidly growing population became a burden to "four 
modernization" campaign, the government introduced the one-child policy in 
1979. The policy seems to be effective. Population targets were met and the total 
fertility rate dropped even below the replacement level. 
However, undesired consequences accompany those successes. The sex ratio at 
birth, relative mortality rate for infant females to males and the number of girl 
abandonment have increased. A shortage of women in marriage market and such 
crimes as abduction are foreseeable. The problems inadvertently introduced by 
the population policy must be seriously addressed. 
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There is no doubt a large amount of literature on gender preference. Causal 
analyses with the help of using such indicators of gender preference as the sex 
ratio at birth or relative survival rates of male and female children, suggest that 
gender preference is influenced by economic, social, cultural factors and family 
sizes. Many contributions have been made in those works. However, few 
econometric studies have used indicators for gender preference as the dependent 
variable to analyze the determinants of gender preference in the Chinese 
Mainland. 
One contribution of this thesis is the use of a rigorous economic framework to 
study gender preference. To be more specific, two econometric models using the 
desired sex of the next child and the difference in the number of sons and 
daughters as the dependent variables are introduced. These models are then 
estimated with the help of data from Gansu province collected in the second 
phase of the Chinese Mainland In-depth Fertility Survey conducted on 1988. 
The estimated results suggest that: (1) son preference does exist; (2) economic, 
social and cultural factors and population policy have impacts on gender bias; (3) 
there is a dilemma between population control and son bias. The one-child policy 
has been quite successful in limiting the growth of population. But the existence 
of son preference leads to problems like high sex ratio at birth and abandonment 
of female infants. It also reduces the effectiveness of the population policy, as 
some people choose to go against the one-child policy. 
What should be done to improve the situation? In the analysis of the second 
model, we have found that if the number of children increases, the gender 
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preference will decrease. Relaxing the one-child policy should also help to lower 
the sex ratio at birth and number of abandoned girls. If the one-child policy is to 
go on some more years, it is certain that the social dependency rate"" of the 
population will increase and aging issues will emerge as fewer children will be 
born every year. Relaxing the one-child policy could also solve these problems. 
However, what would be the impact of such a change? Although the fertility rate 
has fallen below the replacement level, we do not know the extent to which it is 
influenced by the one-child policy. Will fertility drastically jump if the one-child 
policy is replaced by, say, a two-child policy? A lot of very careful studies must 
be done before relaxing the one-child policy. 
As the findings show, economic reasons are among the important factors behind 
gender bias as households not only regard children as consumption goods, but 
also as investment goods. Increase in the expected contribution of a daughter will 
reduce the son preference. Income for work is an essential element of the 
expected contribution of a child. However, in fact, there is evidence that women 
and men are not treated equally in economic aspect such as the compensation in 
the workplace. There is a survey showing that women are less favored than men 
in the workplace. (Wang 1994) Some analysts even find out that women are the 
first to lose their jobs and last to be rehired. (South China Morning Post, March 
10, 1999) Since the expected contribution of females to households influences 
the choice of the sex of their children, this kind of discrimination may be 
pertinent to the issue of the sex ratio at birth. The economic inequality between 
the sexes should be addressed. The introduction of regulations against sexual 
discrimination should be considered carefully. At the same time, developing a 
47 See Appendix 1 for its definition. 
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market economic system including the labor market is also essential. This is 
because a well-developed market economy rewards people according to their 
market value rather than to their gender. 
Education is a very important means to increase one's productivity. According to 
our estimated result, if women receive more education, the son preference will be 
reduced. However, in our sample, women only received 3 years of education on 
average, while the figure is 6 years for men. (Table 25.a) According to the China 
Statistical Yearbook 1999，63 per cent of people who educated up to college 
level and higher are male, while the illiteracy rate for males aged six or over is 
8.1 per cent, that for females is 19.5 per cent. The inequality of education 
between the two sexes is very clear and serious. This is the result of son 
preference and in turn it reinforces the son preference. To close the earning gap 
between men and women, inequality in education between the two sexes must be 
addressed and improved. Education also helps to eliminate son preference by 
introducing the concept of gender equality. We proved that this effect could 
reduce the gender preference in model 1. Therefore helping girls to receive more 
education is an urgent task. This is especially true in rural and poor areas as the 
inequality usually is greater in those areas. In some poor areas, households only 
send boys to school as they cannot afford to send all their children. 
Old age security is one element of the contribution children make to their parents. 
As sons rather than daughters traditionally support their parents at old age, 
people prefer sons rather than girls. A pension fund can help as it can secure 
people's old age without relying too much on their children. Although the 
intention to build a social security system has been announced for many years 
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and some pilot programs in some areas (shi dian) have been established, the 
government has really done very little due to the inadequate funding. Social 
security is still quite limited. 
According to our models, the income effect may reduce the gender preference. 
Economic development in a region may thus be beneficial to gender equality. In 
the poorer areas, helping the poor to improve their earning ability will help. 
Family planning should be implemented with policies helping the poor such as 
introducing better seeds and agricultural products with higher economic value. 
As gender bias is partly the result of low women status, raising the status of 
women in society would help. The value of housework should be addressed as 
women do most of it. Women in a traditional Chinese family only bear the 
responsibility of house keeping. However, the value of housework is not fully 
recognized since it is hard to value in monetary terms. In westem countries, the 
value of housework is recognized as there are markets for it, such as markets for 
domestic helpers and baby-sitters. Their wages reveal the value of housework. 
The political status of women should also be addressed. Although there are some 
women in the upper layers of the political institution of the Chinese Mainland, 
many of the important posts are held by men. Women having more power in the 
political area would raise the women status and help to reduce the son 
preference. 
The above pertains to the long term solutions addressing gender bias. However, 
as the inequality is severe, some short term measures should be considered. As 
shown in model 2’ stricter monitoring of people's fertility behaviors may help. 
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For example, the tightening of the control of family policy in Jiaozhao city of 
Shandong reduces the sex ratio at birth, although tighter monitoring cannot 
change the gender preference. (Family Planning Committee of Jiaozhao city, 
1997) It may also help reduce the number of abandoned girls if the monitoring is 
strict enough. But it will be very costly especially in terms of manpower. 
Banning the use of ultrasound B equipment for prenatal sex determination may 
also be effective in reducing the sex ratio at birth. However, as pointed out by 
Goodkind (1996), tighter monitoring on prenatal sex selection may lead to 
postnatal discrimination, which should also be avoided. 
In short, to implement the population policy with less adverse effect, we suggest: 
(1) in the long run, the education and social status of women should be improved 
and a sound social security system should be established; (2) enacting regulation 
against sex discrimination should be considered; and (3) as the short term means, 
strict monitoring of peoples' fertility behaviors should be considered. 
1 3 7 
Appendix 
Appendix 1. Definition of Indicators" 
1.1/ Sex ratio at birth (SRB) 
SRB refers to the ratio between the total number of male born in a period over 
total number of female in the same period. 
SRB = -
D, 
where S； = total number of male born in a specified period i 
Dj = total number of female born in a specified period i 
1.2/ Fertility rate 
Fertility rate refers to the ratio of the number of births (usually per year) per 1000 
women of childbearing age, usually 15 - 44. 
_ .,. number of births 
Fertility rate =——； x 1000%c 
number of women 
48 References for this section are China Statistical Yearbook 1998 and the web page of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nation Population Division 
(http://www.undp.org/popin/). 
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1.3/ Total fertility rate (TFR) 
Total fertility rate refers to the summary overall measure of fertility obtained by 
summing the age specific fertility rates for each year of the childbearing span, 
usually 15 - 44. 
T F R = ^AFRi 
where 
total number of births to women aged i 
AFR = ~ ~ — ~ ~ 7 ^ ^ X 1000%c 
total number of women aged i 
AFR is age-specific fertility rate referring to the ratio of total number of birth to 
women at a specified age over the total number of women at the same age during 
a certain period of time (usually a year), which is often expressed in %o. 
1.4/ Birth rate 
Birth rate refers to the ratio of the number of births to the average population 
during a certain period of time (usually a year), which is often expressed in %c. 
^ . , number of births 
Birth rate = ; ~ ~ x 1000%o 
average number of population 
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1.5/ Death rate 
Death rate refers to the ratio of the number of deaths to the average population 
during a certain period of time (usually a year), which is often expressed in %c. 
^ , number of deaths 
Death rate = ； ： x lOOO%c 
average number of population 
VII.1.6/ Natural growth rate of population 
Natural growth rate of population refers to the ratio of the number of natural 
increase in population (number of births minus number of deaths) in a certain 
period (usually a year) to the average population of the same period, which is 
often expressed in %c. 
�T , , ^ , • number of births - number of deaths 
Natural growth rate of population = x lOOO%c 
average number of population 
1.7/ Social dependency ratio (SRS) 
Social dependency ratio refers to the ratio of the number of dependents to the 
total number of social laborers. 
^ n ^ number of dependents 
SRS = xlOO% 
total number of social laborers 
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Appendix 2. Multinomial Logit ModeP 
In some cases the dependent variables may be discrete ones, such as "yes" or 
"no". To deal with such kind of variables, a qualitative model must be used. 
Logit model is one of it. The basic formation of a logit model is a binary choice 
model, i.e. the dependent variable only take two value. 
For example, buy a car (Y=1) or not (Y=0). It is considered that a set of factors 
should have influence on the decision, such as income, price of car, price of 
gasoline. So that, 
Prob (Y=l) = F(P'X) 
Prob (Y=0) = 1 - F(P'X) 
Where p & X are vectors 
The probability model become, 
E [y ]=0[ l -F (p 'X) ] + l[F(p'X)] 
= F(P'X) 
In a logit model, the probability follows a logistic distribution, 
Prob(Y = l ) = e x p ( f X ) 
l + exp(y^'X) 
Prob(Y = 0) = l - exP(AX) 
l + exp(y^'X) 
The estimation model is a log likelihood model, 
•*9 The main reference for this appendix is Greene (1990) and Thomas(1997). 
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In L = E [y,ln F(P,X) + (1-yd In (l-F(P'X))] 
i 
Both the predicted probabilities, F(0'X) = Fp, and the estimated marginal effects, 
f(fi'X) (g) = fg, where g is the estimated P in the above log likelihood model, are 
nonlinear functions of g. 
The above model is designed for binary choice model only, bi order to deal with 
a discrete dependent variable with more than two choices, we have to use a 
multiple-choice setting. There are two kinds of data in a multiple-choice setting, 
namely, ordered and unordered. The examples of ordered data are bond rating 
and the level of insurance coverage. However, in our model, the choices are (1) 
no preference for the sex of the next child, (2) desired sex of the next child is 
male (3) and the desired sex of the next child is female. This is an unordered data 
format. Therefore, we are going to construct an unordered multiple-choice model. 
With a random utility model, an individual i faced with J choices, we assume his 
utility function with the choice j as: 
U, = P'X, + £« 
where X is a vector of independent variables 
If an individual i chooses j among the J choices, we assume his utility reaches 
maximum value. In other words, the utility is highest with the choice j than 
other choices, such as k. 
Prob (Uij > Uik) for all other k 内 
Assuming the probability follows a logistic distribution. 
Prob(Y. = j) = exP(") 'X ' ) k = 1, 2，3...J 
^ exp(A'X,) 
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To estimate the parameters, we put it in log likelihood format. 
I n L = Z Z d i j I n Prob(Yi=j) where j= l , 2 , 3 . . . J 
where d” = 1 if Y , = j , � =0 if Y^  = k, for all k^^j. 
Then we have the multinomial logit model. As stated above, the marginal effect 
of an independent variable is not ¢, but is f(g'X) (¢) = ffi. Both the predicted 
probabilities, F(g'X) = Fp, and the estimated marginal effects, ¢ , where^ is the 
estimated p in the above log likelihood model, are nonlinear functions of ¢. 
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Appendix 3. Different Model Specifications 
A.3.1 Model 1 
Table A. la Estimated Results of Model 1 with Different Specifications (1) 
Variables S1 S2$ S3 
~dProb~~dProb(Y=2 dProb~~dProb(Y=2 dProb~~dProb(Y=2 
(Y=l)/dx )/dx (Y=l)/dx )/dx (Y=l)/dx )/dx 
Constant 0.79219 -0.26695 0 . 7 9 3 3 0 ~ ~ - 0 . 2 5 9 3 4 ~ ~ 0 . 7 8 7 6 7 -0.27688 
(3.88240) (-0.668860) (3.91106) (-0.615231) (3.73594) (-0.749273) 
* * * • * * * * * 
Having the first child 0.00075165 0.025587 
after 1979 or no child (0.242986) (0.788443) 
yet 
Difference in the -0.29462 0.21054 -0.29491 0.21071 -0.29483 0.21080 
number o f sons and (-13.7647) (7.49845) (-13.8008) (7.49390) (-13.7153) (7.51024) 
daughlers *** *** *** *•* *** *** 
Household without -0.067849 -0.063209 -0.067820 -0.063580 -0.068235 -0.064374 
children (-4.84392) (-2.79246) (-4.84199) (-2.79727) (-4.79534) (-2.83137) 
* * * * * * * * * 木 * * * * * * * * 
Number ofchildren 
Respondent's age -0.015704 0.019815 -0.015856 0.019568 -0.015228 0.018586 
(-0.501534) (1.41793) (-0.520940) (1.39179) (-0.504321) (1.32150) 
氺 氺 氺 
Respondent's age**2 0.00017246 -0.0003312 0.00017510 -0.0003279 0.00016304 -0.0002996 
(0.135733) (-1.49540) (0.153171) (-1.47321) (0.150046) (-1.33600) 
* * * 
Respondent's -0.025122 -0.013227 -0.025052 -0.013427 -0.025204 -0.013590 
husband's age (-2.28588) (-2.00972) (-2.28822) (-2.02546) (-2.29911) (-2.05051) 
* * 氺 * * * * * * * * * * * 
Respondent's 0.00044060 0.00022055 0.00043895 0.00022331 0.00044163 0.00022816 
husband's age**2 (2.37648) (2.16450) (2.37751) (2.17818) (2.39165) (2.22141) 
>|«氺木 氺 * * * 氺 * * * * * 氺氺 
Respondent's -0.0007198 0.0020673 -0.0006939 0.0021759 -0.0007370 0.0020242 
educationlevel (0.054450) (1.10063) (0.082113) (1.16629) (0.039527) (1.07339) 
( C o n t i n u e d o n n e x t p a g e ) 
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Table A . l a - continued 
Variables S1 S2$ S3 
~dProb~~dProb(Y=2 dProb~~~dProb(Y=2 dProb~~dProb(Y=2 
(Y=l)/dx )/dx (Y=l)/dx )/dx (Y=l)/dx )/dx 
Respondent's -0.0015354 0.0028141 -0.0015335 0.0028393 -0.0015241 0.0028007 
husband'seducation (-0.149248) (1.29722) (-0.146236) (1.30837) (-0.147395) (1.29301) 
level * * * 
Respondent works in 0.014348 -0.0020065 0.014742 -0.0015730 0.014667 -0.0027789 
the non-agricultural (0.287367) (0.036712) (0.299660) (0.053270) (0.287016) (0.013669) 
sector 
Respondent's 0.053105 -0.0067055 0.052176 -0.0088578 0.052995 -0.0070672 
husband works in lhe (1.99605) (0.269368) (1.93370) (0.139463) (1.98688) (0.246693) 
non-agricultural ** ** ** 
sector 
Livinginci ly -0.093908 0.072338 -0.093646 0.073371 -0.093839 0.071936 
(-1.12635) (1.49250) (-1.11649) (1.52483) (-1.12684) (1.47939) 
* * * 
Living in town -0.035731 -0.054860 -0.035230 -0.054283 -0.036087 -0.053665 
(-1.33852) (-1.82494) (-1.31929) (-1.80255) (-1.33388) (-1.79208) 
* * * * * * * * * 
Household annual -8.39960D- -5.24549D- -8.39655D- -5.33844D- -8.42475D- -5.03973D-
'ncome 06 06 06 06 06 06 
(-1.72267) (-1.12330) (-1.72695) (-1.13435) (-1.71149) (-1.08771) 
* * * * * * 
Washing machine -0.068540 0.077436 -0.068301 0.078156 -0.068414 0.077890 
(-0.785606) (2.05200) (-0.776899) (2.07534) (-0.779220) (2.06487) 
* * * * * 氺 
Sewing machine -0.045989 -0.0019255 -0.046337 -0.0028490 -0.046126 -0.0011518 
(-2.54690) (-0.882263) (-2.58862) (-0.954354) (-2.33471) (-0.824353) 
* * * * * * * 氺 氺 
Refrigerator -0.29754 0.12508 -0.29780 0.12476 -0.29830 0.12718 
(-1.47322) (0.690932) (-1.47609) (0.687218) (-1.47558) (0.705969) 
* * 本 
Television 0.0085746 0.035287 0.0089456 0.036016 0.0084992 0.035157 
(0.866788) (1.87095) (0.889511) (1.90829) (0.860571) (1.86363) 
* * * * * 本 
( C o n t i n u e d o n n e x t p a g e ) 
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Table A.la - continued 
Variables S1 S2$ S3 
dProb dProb(Y=2 dProb dProb(Y=2 dProb dProb(Y=2 
(Y=l)/dx )/dx (Y=l)/dx )/dx (Y=l)/dx )/dx 
Respondent's 0 . 3 2 3 0 7 ~ ~ - 0 . 0 4 6 4 7 4 ~ ~ 0 . 3 2 2 5 0 ~ ~ - 0 . 0 4 7 2 1 9 ~ ~ 0 . 3 2 0 1 9 ~ ~ ~ - 0 . 0 3 7 8 6 2 
nationality is Han (2.07321) (0.257024) (2.06405) (0.245617) (2.06274) (0.346696) 
* * * * * * 
Respondent's -0.24182 0.038006 -0.24113 0.037913 -0.23896 0.029257 
husband's nationality (-1.53174) (-0.156432) (-1.52508) (-0.154307) (-1.52538) (-0.244849) 
is Han * * * 
Likelihood ratio 1317.456*** 1318.47*** 1318.072*** 
Percent of correct 74.97% 75.10% 74.79% 
prediction 
Sample size 1670 1671 1670 
Inside the ( ) are t-statistics 
*** 1% significant level 
** 5% significant level 
* 10% significant level 
# all l-test values are for the estimated p. 
S1 is the specification used in the thesis 
$ including unmarried women 
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Table A.lb Estimated Results of Model 1 with Different Specifications (2) 
Variables S4 S5 ‘ S6 
dProb dProb(Y=2 dProb dProb(Y= dProb dProb(Y=2 
(Y=l)/dx )/dx (Y=l)/dx 2)/dx (Y=l)/dx )/dx 
Constant 0.22017 -0.21521 0 .74489~~-0 .27101 0.24241 -0.22157 
(2.42095) (-3.80065) (3.61142) (-0.78011) (2.94311) (-3.83813) 
*** *** *** *** *** 
Having the first child 
after 1979 or no child 
yet 
Difference in the -0.28511 0.20342 -0.29184 0.20643 -0.29173 0.20949 
number ofsons and (-13.5072) (7.43704) (-13.7390) (7.44106) (-13.7042) (7.43026) 
daughters *** **• *** *** *** *** 
Household withoul -0.017100 -0.096176 -0.067168 -0.068409 -0.049200 -0.065625 
children (-1.68848) (-3.27148) (-4.91924) (-2.96795) (-4.19636) (-2.74976) 
* * * * * * * * *** * * * * * * 
Numberofchildren 0.023286 -0.022715 
(0.676624) (-1.35901) 
氺 
Respondent's age -0.0029925 0.0013639 -0.016076 0.019517 -0.0026768 0.00058419 
(-0.800767) (0.317118) (-0.538254) (1.39416) (-0.800634) (0.196095E 
* - 0 2 ) 
Respondent's age**2 0.00016987 -0.0003250 
(0.136477) (-1.47652) 
* 
Respondent's 0.00035661 0.0011807 -0.018257 -0.013208 0.00057421 0.00095140 
husband's age (0.311677) (0.654417) (-1.78435) (-1.81691) (0.361325) (0.564623) 
* * * * 
Respondent's 0.00034386 0.0002219 
husband's age**2 (1.96348)(丨.99786) 
* * 氺 * 
Respondent's -0.0006903 0.0023661 -0.0007904 0.0023782 -0.00087486 0.0021980 
education level (0.112023) (1.29810) (0.078678) (1.27997) (0.011624) (1.17473) 
* 
( C o n t i n u e d o n n e x t p a g e ) 
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Table A. lb - continued 
Variables ^ S5 S6 
dProb dProb(Y=2 dProb dProb(Y= dProb dProb(Y=2  
(Y=l)/dx )/dx (Y=l)/dx 2)/dx (Y=l)/dx )/dx 
Respondent's -0.0021051 0.0033509 0.00007102 0.0029368 -0.0019799 0.0029079 
husband'seducation (-0.297038) (1.53718) (0.523645) (1.58645) (-0.311906) (1.31697) 
level * * * 
Respondent works in 0.027519 0.0030675 
the non-agricultural (0.601159) (0.295464) 
sector 
Respondent's 0.044645 -0.0044726 
husband works in the (1.70817) (0.288849) 
non-agricultural ** 
sector 
Living in city -0.060443 0.071073 -0.11747 0.082423 -0.062025 0.065390 
(-0.650315) (1.93887) (-1.46687) (1.67863) (-0.709478) (1.70745) 
* * * * * * * 
Living in town -0.019127 -0.062081 0.070637 -0.052370 -0.024514 -0.059947 
(-1.05177) (-1.99352) (-2.17488) (-2.03513) (-1.16534) (-1.96016) 
* * * * * * * * 
Household annual -8.44941D- -1.01222D- - -2.46687D- -7.59938D- -5.75843D-
income 06 06 0.00001307 06 06 06 
(-1.46753) (-0.466095) (-2.37184) (-0.89243) (-1.62604) (-1.18060) 
* 木 * 氺 氺 
Washing machine -0.053653 0.088750 -0.066882 0.087854 -0.057931 0.077653 
(-0.416253) (2.72448) (-0.675958) (2.48694) (-0.580334) (2.22139) 
* * * * * * * * 
Sewing machine -0.041034 0.00051030 -0.043339 -0.0003802 
(-2.23682) (-0.611794) (-2.36750) (-0.721906) 
I^ efrigeraUM" -0.28319 0.12922 
(-1.37809) (0.778488) 
* 
Television 0.012909 0.034002 
(1.00858) (1.85965) 
** 
( C o n t i n u e d o n n e x t p a g e ) 
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Table A . lb - continued 
Variables S4 S5 S6 
dProb dProb(Y=2 dProb dProb(Y= dProb dProb(Y=2 
(Y=l)/dx )/dx (Y=l)/dx 2)/dx (Y=l)/dx )/dx 
Respondent's 0 .25588~~-0 .037632 0.27007 -0.046928 
nationality is Han (1.48853) (0.180278) (1.56328) (0.114820) 
* * 
Respondent's -0.18310 0.025339 -0.20123 0.039489 
husband's nationality (-1.06125) (-0.143803) (-1.14511) (-0.040286) 
is Han 
Likelihood ratio 1293.638*** 1291.45*** 1298.02*** 
Percent of correct 74.25% 74.85% 74.55% 
prediction 
Sample size 1670 1670 1670 
Inside the ( ) are t-statistics 
*** 1% significant level 
** 5% significant level 
* 10% significant level 
# all t-test values are for the estimated p . 
1 4 9 
Corresponding "Hit and Miss，，Tables for the 6 Specifications 
Table A.2a S1 
Actual Total 
0 i 2 
0 ^ ^ I2 78 
Predicted 1 196 928 14 1138 
2 107 61 286 454 
Total 341 1017 312 1670 
Percent of correct prediction: 74.97% 
Table A.2b S2 
Actual Total 
0 i 2 
0 ^ f i n Ti 
Predicted 1 196 929 14 1139 
2 107 61 287 455 
Total 342 1017 312 1671 
Percent of correct prediction: 75.10% 
Table A.2c S3 
Actual Total 
0 1 2 
0 ^ 1% f5 8l 
Predicted 1 196 928 14 1138 
2 107 61 283 451 
Total 341 1017 312 1670 
Percent of correct prediction: 74.79% 
1 5 0 
Table A.2d S4 
Actual Total 
0 1 2 
0 ^ M [3 T% 
Predicted 1 202 923 13 1138 
2 108 60 286 454 
Total 341 1017 312 1670 
Percent of correct prediction: 74 .25% 
Table A.2e S5 
Actual Total 
0 i 2 
0 ^ rs H ^ 
Predicted 1 205 933 10 1148 
2 107 61 288 456 
Total 341 1017 312 1670 
Percent of correct prediction: 74.85% 
Table A.2f S6 
Actual Total 
0 i 2 
0 ^ ^ io T\ 
Predicted 1 203 926 12 1141 
2 109 59 290 458 
Total 341 1017 312 1670 
Percent of correct prediction: 74.55% 
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A.3.2 Model 2 
Table A.3a Results of Model 2 with Different Specifications (1) 
Variables ^ S ^ S3 S4 
Constant 2.55853 2.46104 2.42392 2.37844 
(7.46372) (7.48833) (7.39309) (7.31752) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
Having the first child after -0.121798 -0.108901 -0.128605 -0.125832 
1979 (-0.928237) (-0.846534) (-0.986217) (-0.968953) 
Number of children -0.207119 -0.203498 -0.204153 -0.197316 
(-4.50735) (-4.60696) (-4.46611) (-4.34347) 
* * * * * * * * * * * 本 
Respondent's age when lhe 0.018271 -0.920880E-03 -0.015367 -0.018579 
first child was born (0.321437) (-0.016486) (-0.985840) (-1.19250) 
Respondent's age when the last -0.050985 -0.032161 -0.025367 -0.024469 
child was born (-0.901843) (-0.578269) (-2.19838) (-2.12733) 
* * * * 
Respondent's husband's age -0.036684 -0.017045 
when the first child was born (-0.642825) (-0.303814) 
Respondent's husband's age 0.026015 0.730350E-02 
when the last child was born (0.454422) (0.129724) 
Respondent works in the non-
agricultural sector 
Respondent's husband works 
in the non-agricultural sector 
Respondent'seducationlevel -0.177723E-02 -0.803592E-02 -0.293144E-02 -.405718E-02 
(-0.153671) (-0.705232) (-0.254129) (-0.355265) 
Respondent's education 
level**2 
Respondent's husband's -0.020510 -0.019694 -0.018036 -0.017786 
education level (-2.27852) (-2.23512) (-2.00446) (-1.97414) 
* * 氺 * * * * * 
Respondent's husband's 
education level**2 
Local representatives asked -0.109835 -0.093802 -0.113742 
about children (-1.86982) (-1.62573) (-1.94094) 
* * * * * 
( C o n t i n u e d o n n e x t p a g e ) 
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Table A.3a - continued 
Variables ^ S ^ S3 S4 
Respondent lived in city in her 2.55853 2.46104 2.42392 2.37844 
childhood (7.46372) (7.48833) (7.39309) (7.31752) 
* * * * * • * 氺 * * * * 
Respondent lived in town in 0.198547 0.215590 0.206581 
her childhood (0.841352) (0.929535) (0.875882) 
Respondent's husband lived in -0.175712 -0.185676 -0.128218 
city in his childhood (-1.19730) (-1.30848) (-0.860458) 
氺 
Respondent's husband lived in 0.190281 0.098680 0.195761 
town in his childhood (0.845750) (0.444757) (0.868578) 
Living in city -0.050453 -0.819895E-02 -0.072420 -0.177261 
(-0.303334) (-0.050229) (-0.436153) (-1.26427) 
Living in town -0.461540 -0.228480 -0.468631 -0.292196 
(-2.17144) (-1.05464) (-2.19932) (-1.72371) 
* * * * * * 
Household monthly income 
Household annual income 0.512548E-04 0.560345E-04 0.487304E-04 0.508284E-04 
(1.98492) (2.21536) (1.90849) (1.98298) 
* * * * * * • 氺 
Building material ofhouse: 
Concrete 
Building material of house: 
Brick 
Washing machine 0.046956 0.030315 0.044773 0.675486E-02 
(0.377056) (0.246625) (0.359261) (0.055211) 
Sewing machine 0.042169 0.044335 0.031616 0.043731 
(0.651621) (0.698317) (0.488309) (0.678682) 
Refrigerator -0.382655 -0.369688 -0.386184 -0.399080 
(-1.43089) (-1.38037) (-1.45284) (-1.52498) 
* * 氺 * 
Television -0.099838 -0.094227 -0.088533 -0.093250 
(-1.26292) (-1.20639) (-1.11280) (-1.17471) 
Respondent's nationality is -0.296958 -0.074261 -0.285615 -0.273392 
Han (-0.712237) (-0.182606) (-0.687327) (-0.669923) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A.3a - continued 
Variables ^ ^ ^ S4 
Respondent's husband's 0.359600E-02 -0.167940 0.021194 0.023425 
nationality is Han (0.838445E-02) (-0.401032) (0.049619) (0.056023) 
Household living with elderly -0.177650 -0.158956 -0.166485 -0.164974 
parents (-2.25734) (-2.08372) (-2.13947) (-2.11814) 
* 木 * * ** Xc* 
Interactive variables 
(Respondent's education level) -0.038416 -0.031626 -0.036687 -0.036541 
* (Having the first child after (-2.49893) (-2.09171) (-2.39115) (-2.38792) 
1979) *** ** **+ *** 
(Respondent's husband's 0.044195 0.040991 0.043208 0.041485 
education level) * (Having the (2.73791) (2.59654) (2.68079) (2.57179) 
first child after 1979) *** *** *** *** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.037853 0.036172 0.037320 0 . 0 3 5 9 5 4 ~ ~ 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 6.37568*** 6.35026*** 6.77801*** 8.10252*** 
Sample size 3417 3565 3429 3429 
Inside the ( ) are t-statistics 
*** 1% significant level 
** 5% significant level 
* 10% significant level 
S1 is the specification used in the thesis 
$ Excluding those observations where there are errors in the data of ages of husband when they 
have their first and last children 
* Including observations whom have remarriage. 
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Table A.3b Results of Model 2 with Different Specifications (2) 
Variables S5 ^ S7 
Constant ~ 2.12454 2.11368 0.574131 
(6.32143) (7.08689) (1.95134) 
* * * * * * * * 
Having the first child after 1979 -0.062990 0.049609 0.380805 
(-0.490079) (0.667856) (5.46437) 
Number ofchiIdren -0.262751 -0.193726 
(-7.63782) (-4.28673) 
**• *** 
Respondent's age when the first child was -0.038606 -0.018847 -0.92717E-02 
born (-3.25733) (-1.20728) (-0.790823) 
* * * 
Respondent's age when the last child was born -0.023191 
(-2.01934) 
** 
Respondent's husband's age when the first 
child was born 
Respondent's husband's age when the last 
child was born 
Respondent works in the non-agricultural 0.051755 0.111083 
sector (0.362453) (0.773063) 
Respondent's husband works in the non- 0.088211 0.104501 
agricultural sector (1.10040) (1.26258) 
Respondent'seducationlevel -0.56663E-02 0.013766 0.700685E-02 
(-0.487335) (0.590334) (0.292215) 
Respondent's education level**2 -0.331129E-02 -.0.266125E-02 
(-1.42486) (-1.11788) 
* 
Respondent's husband's education level 0.017825 -0.040309 -0.023846 
(-1.97002) (-2.10758) (-1.24150) 
** ** 
Respondent's husband's education level**2 0.277214E-02 0.201432E-02 
(1.76266) (1.27389) 
** 
( C o n t i n u e d o n n e x t p a g e ) 
1 5 5 
Table A.3b - continued 
Variables ~S5 ^ S7 
Local representatives asked about children 0.100286 0.035176 
(1.71065) (0.589807) 
** 
Respondent lived in city in her childhood -0.131100 
(-0.774602) 
Respondent lived in town in her childhood 0.292387 
(1.21501) 
Respondent's husband lived in city in his -0.211811 -0.086616 
childhood (-1.44513) (-0.558560) 
* 
Respondent's husband lived in town in his 0.217987 0.150595 
childhood (0.977524) (0.676511) 
Living in city -0.201760 -0.150940 -0.157081 
(-1.14811) (-1.08228) (-0.869162) 
Living in town -0.433964 -0.229347 -0.515477 
(-2.16093) (-1.40696) (-2.32529) 
* * * * * 
Household monthly income 0.471186E-03 0.382073E-03 
(1.58937) (1.40223) 
* * 
Household annual income 0.180058E-04 0.558244E-04 0.339742E-05 
(0.592885) (2.22577) (0.115203) 
** 
Building material of house: Concrete 0.065751 0.097145 
(0.353939) (0.524506) 
Building material ofhouse: Brick -0.089831 -0.074509 
(-0.526880) (-0.437921) 
Washing machine 0.014866 -0.744637E-02 0.038726 
(0.114200) (-0.060605) (0.292761) 
Sewing machine 0.029890 0.035643 -0.035834 
(0.461510) (0.554413) (-0.544064) 
Refrigerator -0.423889 -0.399163 -0.318471 
(-1.61177) (-1.55021) (-1.17720) 
* * 
( C o n t i n u e d o n n e x t p a g e ) 
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Table A.3b - continued 
Variables ~ ~ S 5 ^ S7 
Television -0.102233 -0.082551 - 0 . 0 4 9 8 8 5 ~ ~ 
(-1-28596) (-1.02918) (-0.612014) 
* 
Respondent's nationality is Han -0.257215 -0.224259 
(-0.619064) (-0.535018) 
Respondent's husband's nationality is Han 0.021424 0.133634 
(0.050336) (0.311455) 
Household living with elderly parents -0.169434 -0.173573 -0.165025 
(-2.17552) (-2.22614) (-2.10946) 
* * * • ^ 5 | j 
Interactive variables 
(Respondent's education level) * (Having the -0.034843 . 
first child after 1979) (-2.27858) 
* 氺 
(Respondent's husband's education level) * 0.040675 
(Having the first child after 1979) (2.52548) 
* * * 
Adjusted R-squared ‘ 0.035431 0.034633 0.624971E-02 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 6.03675*** 8.68635*** 1.82918*** 
Sample size 3429 3429 3429 
Inside the ( ) are t-statistics 
*** 1 % significant level 
** 5% significant level 
* 10% significant level 
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